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Abstract 
In the context of western liberal democracies, both the German state and the German 
nation have undergone a unique evolutionary process during the twentieth century.  
Stemming from this anomalous development, citizenship in Germany represents not only 
membership in the German polity but also membership in the German cultural 
community.  Naturalization standards, in contrast to every major immigrant-receiving 
state, were thus traditionally based on descent-based (as opposed to territorial-based) 
standards.  Consequentially, the large population of foreign guestworkers that entered 
Germany through post-War labor recruitment programs has been systematically excluded 
from formal state membership.  This exclusion, by producing a disempowered and 
disillusioned class of pseudo-citizens, has produced alarming tensions between ethnic 
German citizens and foreign resident minorities.  The Nationality Act, enacted in 2000, 
attempted to address this friction by implementing a naturalization regime with a partial 
jus soli element.  This study thus aims to determine whether the Nationality Act of 2000, 
by implementing paradigmatic reforms, has proven capable of facilitating the desired 
process of structural integration. 
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Chapter 1: Overview of the Paper 
 
1.1- Introduction 
  
In the spring of 2006 a group of teachers at the Rütli School in Neu Kölln wrote 
an open letter to a Berlin newspaper complaining of uncontrollable violence among the 
school’s pupils.  The violence had reached such heights that teachers, feeling physically 
threatened, refused to enter their classrooms without the protection of mobile phones.  
The shocking nature of the incident understandably appalled public sentiments in 
Germany.  But, with 83% of the Rütli School student-body tracing its background to non-
German origins, the story not only shocked the public but it also produced a telling range 
of polarizing reactions.  Responses to the incident ranged from demands for metal-
detectors in the school to policies that would punish immigrant families that failed to 
learn German.  Despite the various solutions proffered, most pundits agreed, at least to 
some extent, on the routes of the problem.  With an alarming and undeniable gap between 
the socioeconomic position of children from non-German and German backgrounds, the 
children of immigrant families are instilled, from a very early age, with the “self-
consciousness of being losers.”  Commentators observe that this dynamic, specifically the 
relationship between socioeconomic disadvantage and cultural and political 
marginalization, is distressingly similar to the dynamic that sparked the suburban riots 
that plagued France in November of 2005.  With these nascent indicators of full-blown 
rioting ominously looming overhead, policymakers now face the unenviable imperative 
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of attempting to address the latent sources of foreign resident alienation and 
disillusionment.1  
 Ever since the reunification of Germany in 1990, legislative reforms have 
attempted to address the issue of immigrant integration.  As the Rütli School anecdote 
evidences, however, these attempts have ostensibly failed to achieve their intended 
objective.  But, do such incidents necessarily mean that these reforms have indeed failed?  
Or, does Rütli simply indicate that integration is a gradual process and not a rapid 
transition?  In fact, have the socioeconomic positions of immigrants and natives 
undergone a noticeable process of convergence during this period?  Or, have these 
reforms simply proved unsuccessful at producing any significant change?  Indeed, have 
these policies failed so incredibly that such tensions now threaten the very stability of the 
German polity?  This study aims to address these questions by examining the impact of 
recent policy reforms, specifically the Nationality Act of 1999, on the cultural, economic 
and political positions of the foreign resident population relative to the native German 
community. 
1.2- Germany’s Emergence as an Immigration State 
The integration of the foreign resident population has emerged as an important 
political issue due largely to the inflow of foreign laborers in the years immediately 
following the Second World War.  Ever since this initial surge in immigration, the 
German economy has utterly relied on foreign labor.  Beginning in 1955, Germany 
initiated a massive labor recruitment program to sustain the “economic miracle’ that 
                                                
1 Marc Young, “Germany’s School of Hard Knocks,” Der Spiegel, April 05, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/in 
ternational/0,1518,409876,00.html (accessed November 3, 2006).  
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emerged in the early post-war years.  This recruitment policy resulted in labor 
importation agreements with several countries, including Italy, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, 
Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.  These labor recruitment agreements typically included 
some type of rotation principle that, in theory, mandated the replacement of veteran 
foreign laborers with fresh foreign recruits after an agreed-upon period of employment.  
For several reasons, however, these rotation systems were largely unimplemented, which, 
in turn, allowed many of the “temporary” guestworkers to remain in Germany 
unchallenged.  As a result, when Germany effectively ended large-scale labor recruitment 
in reaction to the global recession of 1973, a sizable population of immigrants had been 
residing in the country for an extended period of time.  After residing in Germany for 
many years, this population began bringing over their families and otherwise establishing 
themselves more permanently in the country.2  The initial labor recruitment of the 1950s, 
although unintentionally, thus left an indelible demographic mark on an originally 
homogenous German country.  
The transformative impact of this immigration on the German population is 
staggering.  Whereas in 1950 only about 500,000 foreigners resided in the Federal 
Republic, by 2005 this population had increased dramatically to, by a conservative 
estimate, 7.3 million foreign residents (Table 1).3  Of this significant population, over 
63% had been residing in the country for more than nine years, while less than 17% had 
been living in the country for less than four years (Table 2).  This population is 
                                                
2 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, The Impact of Immigration on Germany’s Society, October, 
2005: 45. 
3 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Foreign Population 1980 to 2005, http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/b 
evoe/bevoetab7.htm, (accessed February 19, 2007).   
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overwhelmingly comprised of individuals of Turkish descent, approximately 26% of the 
total foreign population, with Italians, at barely 8%, representing the second largest 
national grouping.  In a European context, the immigrant population in Germany, both as 
a concrete number and as a percentage, represents the largest such population on the 
continent, excluding the small principalities such as Luxembourg.  Germany, in little 
more than half a century, has thus transformed from an ethnically-homogenous nation-
state into a modern pluralist society. 
1.3- Ethnocultural Identification in Germany 
Unfortunately, however, a tradition of ethnocultural (ethnic and cultural) national 
identification has made this a difficult transition for Germany. The emergence of this 
ethnocultural identity derived primarily from the late development of the unified German 
state.  With the German nation developing prior to the German state, it proved impossible 
to base citizenship on any institution connected with the state.4  The passage of the 
Imperial and State Citizenship Act of 1913 (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) thus 
aimed at reconciling the inherent difficulty of defining a nation in the absence of a well-
defined state territory.  Pragmatically, the law represented an attempt to prevent the loss 
of citizenship for those migrating between various states of the German Empire.  The 
internally inconsistent citizenship requirements prior to this laws passage were such that 
even a temporary departure from certain states would result in a forfeiture of citizenship 
status, yet, at the same time, entrance into another state would not necessarily provide a 
new form of membership.  As a result, the Imperial and State Citizenship Act of 1913 
                                                
4 Jost Halfmann, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany: Contemporary Dilemmas,” Political Studies 
XLV (1997): 267. 
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instituted a descent-based citizenship standard so as to ensure ethnic Germans would not 
be deprived of their citizenship status because of incongruent citizenship legislation 
between constituent states of the German Empire.5  Despite the ostensible obsolescence 
of this law, it remained in force, with very few amendments, until the Nationality Act 
assumed competency for naturalization standards on January 1, 2000.  
 The amazing resilience of the Imperial and State Citizenship Act of 1913, 
however, does not necessarily provide an indictment of German policy intentions. Rather, 
Germany, as arguably the most profoundly affected power of the Cold War, faced unique 
political challenges during this extended confrontation.  Intent on providing residents of 
the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR) with an 
escape from Communism while simultaneously withholding recognition of the legitimacy 
of the East, the Federal Republic maintained the Citizenship Act of 1913 throughout the 
Cold War.  By refusing to pass new citizenship standards, West Germany was able to 
justifiably claim that residents of East Germany still possessed rights to citizenship in the 
Federal Republic.  The maintenance of the Act of 1913 thus represented more of response 
to geopolitical concerns than an assertion of exclusivist policy intentions. 
Although such an exclusivist understanding of German identity did not 
necessarily produce or maintain the Citizenship Act of 1913, this legislation did 
eventually lead to the institutionalization of such citizenship norms.  The legislative 
enshrinement of these ethnocultural norms, combined with the sheer durability of the law, 
                                                
5 Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, “Politically Minded: The Case of Aussiedler as an Ideologically 
Defined Category,” Sozialwissenschaftlicher Fachinformationsdienst, (2001): 3. 
6 
gradually transformed ethnocultural citizenship standards into the accepted determinant 
of German identity.   
1.4- The Implications of an Ethnocultural Heritage 
In addition to the issues that arise in most immigrant-receiving countries, such as 
job competition and natural cultural tensions, the ongoing debate in Germany thus has an 
added dimension.  Unlike in most similar states, German citizenship law has evolved 
around an ethnocultural conception of national identity.  This means that the German 
nation was, until quite recently, defined as a “community of descent,” characterized by a 
shared culture, language and history.6  Although the roots of this conception were entirely 
pragmatic, this ethnocultural notion would eventually become an accepted ideology of 
national identification.  By maintaining a jus sanguinis (descent-based) requirement for 
naturalization, the Citizenship Law of 1913 effectively prohibited the integration of the 
foreign resident community in post-War Germany.  Meanwhile, anti-immigration 
policymakers have successfully relied on this convenient ideological quirk to justify 
exclusivist policies.7  As a result, the ethnocultural tradition in Germany has produced 
excessively strict immigration and integration policies.  
Although some analysts have declared the obsolescence of citizenship in a 
globalizing world governed by norms of universal human rights, it proves difficult to 
completely dismiss the importance of official inclusion into the nation-state.  Without 
reasonable access to citizenship, the “visibility and sharpness” of the foreign immigrant 
                                                
6 Ruud Koopmans, “German and its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship,” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 25 (1999): 630. 
7 Silva Dörr and Thomas Faist, “Institutional Conditions for the Integration of Immigrants in Welfare 
States: A Comparison of the Literature on Germany, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands,” European 
Journal of Political Research 31 (1997): 404.   
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community becomes dangerously obscured.8  As a result, by effectively removing the 
option of naturalization and thus largely masking the needs of the foreign resident 
population, ethnocultural norms have affected the marginalization of this community.  
Their continued exclusion from the German nation has thus transformed the immigrant 
population into a “vulnerable and stigmatized minority” group.9  As implied by such 
minority status, noticeable gaps appear when evaluating important measures of the 
socioeconomic status of the foreign resident community compared to the native German 
population (such as cultural, political and economic disparities).  The below average 
educational and occupational attainment of the foreign resident community, for example, 
often prevents individuals with non-German backgrounds from overcoming the social 
marginalization imposed by their exclusion from the German national community.10 
The inability or unwillingness to construct a comprehensive and effective 
integration policy has thus produced significant repercussions for the immigrant 
population.  Essentially, this systematic withholding of citizenship has created a unique 
class of “resident foreigners” who possess permanent residency rights but lack any 
entitlement to citizenship.  Barred from structural integration, the foreign resident 
population has remained in an isolated foreign enclave.  In effect, these exclusionist 
policies have created an underclass of disadvantaged and often destitute native 
                                                
8 Koopmans, “Germany and its Immigrants,” 631. 
9 Christian Joppke, “How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 22 (1999): 645. 
10 Gert G. Wagner, Felix Büchel, John P. Haisken-DeNew and C. Katharina Spiess, “Education as a 
Keystone of Integration of Immigrants: Determinants of School Attainment of Immigration Children in 
West Germany,”  in Immigration, Citizenship, and the Welfare state in Germany and the United States, 
London: JAI Press, 1998, 40. 
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foreigners.11  Possessing formal rights of residence but lacking citizenship, these native 
foreigners have been methodically marginalized from German society.  
Additionally, if current trends persist, higher fertility rates and decreasing 
emigration figures ensure the steady growth of the already significant foreign resident 
population.  Meanwhile, extremely low fertility rates among ethnic Germans guarantees 
that this population will continue to decrease.12  This perceived threat to the ethnic 
German nation only compounds both the tensions experienced by all immigrant-receiving 
states and the additional tensions produced by Germany’s unique history of ethnocultural 
identification.  With these tensions already resulting in unsettling outbreaks of 
xenophobic violence, the integration of the foreign resident population now represents an 
urgent priority in domestic German politics.13   
1.5- Recent Policy Responses 
The failures of previous integration policies can primarily be attributed to the 
heritage of ethnocultural identification in Germany.  The seemingly progressive 
legislation introduced in 1990 and 1993, for example, proved entirely ineffectual 
precisely because it failed to challenge engrained ethnocultural assumptions.14  As a 
result, both the requirements for citizenship and the process of obtaining it remained 
prohibitive obstacles for prospective German citizens.  The modification of the 
Nationality Act in 1999 by the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD)/Alliance ’90-Greens (Bündnis 90-Die 
                                                
11 Koopmans, “German and its Immigrants,” 628. 
12 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Impact of Immigration,” 19. 
13 Joppke, “How Immigration is Changing Citizenship,” 637. 
14 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Impact of Immigration,” 45. 
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Grünen) coalition government, however, offered a promising starting point for wider 
reform precisely because of its rejection of ethnocultural identity.  By introducing a 
partial jus soli principle (citizenship based on territorial birth) to naturalization standards, 
Germany has taken a significant step towards reforming its immigration and integration 
policy.  In addition, the passage of the Immigration Law in 2004, while not nearly as 
pragmatically consequential as the Nationality Act, represents an important indication of 
Germany’s gradual acceptance of its de facto status as a country of immigration.15  
Although Germany has recently come along way in terms of foreigner policy, there still 
remain many important challenges, specifically the integration of the historically 
marginalized foreign resident community. 
Primarily because of Germany’s ethnocultural tradition, the issue of integration 
has proven one of the most divisive questions for the major political parties in the 
ongoing immigration debate.  For the former SPD/ Alliance ’90-Greens coalition 
government, naturalization served as an important tool in the gradual process of 
integration.  Shortly after assuming control of the government in 1998, the SPD, as the 
senior coalition partner, promised a new citizenship and immigration law.  Indeed, the 
reform of the Nationality Act, which assumed competency in 2000, represented one of 
the first significant actions taken by the new government.  This prioritization of the 
immigration issue derived from the coalition’s assertion that Germany was a country of 
immigration and that ignoring this fact was potentially dangerous.  With Germany thus 
established as a country of immigration, the coalition’s conception of nationhood 
                                                
15 Ibid., 46. 
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disregarded the traditional markers of German nationality (mutual culture, common 
religion, shared language, etc.). Instead, the coalition advocated a civic determination of 
citizenship that rested in the foreign resident’s acknowledgment of the constitutional 
order.  From this perspective, naturalization, then, does not represent the culmination of 
the integration process, as the immigrant no longer needs to conform to various cultural 
requirements before acquiring citizenship.  Instead, the coalition envisioned 
naturalization as means of facilitating integration by formally including the foreign 
resident in the constitutional order. 16 
Contrary to this perspective, the opposition parties, primarily the Christian 
Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) and the 
Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU), viewed naturalization as the 
end-result in a long integration process.17  As late as 1997, the CDU asserted that 
“Germany is not an immigration country and does not want to become one.”18  In 
addition, as late as 2000, the CDU issued a declaration that conceptualized German 
nationality as an identity defined by a common history, culture and social and 
constitutional order.  For the CDU and its sister-party, the CSU, integration is thus “to 
feel connected to the new country’s social, economic, religious, cultural and legal order 
while keeping one’s own identity.”19  By failing to assign the native population any 
responsibility, this definition essentially lays the entire burden of integration on the 
shoulders of the foreign resident community.  From this perspective, naturalization, as 
                                                
16 Yasemin Yüce, “The Challenge of Becoming an Immigration Country” masters thesis presented to the 
Graduate School of Social Science of the Middle East Technical University (2003): 95. 
17 Ibid., 98. 
18 Ibid., 98. 
19 Ibid., 100. 
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acceptance into the German nation, can only occur after an individual has successfully 
conformed his or her behavior to the standards of German society.  In stark contrast to the 
SPD/Greens vision, naturalization thus represents the apex of integration that is only 
conferred once an individual has adopted the necessary social and cultural attributes of 
the German nation.   
   The current coalition government, a partnership between the CDU, CSU and 
SPD, thus contains various discordant views on the immigration issue.  In spite of this 
obstacle, however, the coalition has successfully constructed an immigration platform 
that accepts the naturalization framework established by the Nationality Act of 2000, but 
also calls for long process of integration courses to foster the inclusion of foreigners into 
German society.   This coalition sees naturalization as essential to integration but has 
been content to avoid the polarizing issue of the exact role of naturalization in the 
integration process.20  Instead, they have fashioned a compromise that recognizes both 
the importance of naturalization for integration and the need for integration courses to 
help facilitate this process.   
1.6- Research Question 
 
This thesis thus endeavors to examine the impact of recent legislative 
liberalizations, specifically the implementation of the Nationality Act on January 1, 2000, 
on the structural integration of foreign residents within the Federal Republic of Germany.   
The continued inability to integrate foreign residents into German society makes the new 
legislation, designed to facilitate such a process, an important step towards ensuring 
                                                
20 Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany, Coalition Agreement between the 
CDU, CSU and SPD, November, 2005, 114. 
12 
domestic solidarity and stability; however, engrained suspicions and biases on both sides 
threaten the effectuality of such measures. Whether these reforms can indeed affect 
integration in spite of Germany’s history of ethnoculturalism is thus a central question for 
contemporary policymakers.  This examination first examines the development of 
immigration and integration policy in Germany during the period stretching from the end 
of World War II to the passage of the Nationality Act in 1999.  This context then serves 
as a framework that allows for the accurate assessment of possible correlations between 
liberalized naturalization standards and potential convergences in the socioeconomic 
status of the majority and minority populations in post-2000 Germany.  By focusing on 
these relationships this paper, in short, aims to discover what impact the new 
naturalization policies have had on the structural integration of foreign residents in 
Germany.   
Proponents of the new Nationality Act claim that it offers a significant 
opportunity for the facilitation of the immigrant integration process.  By relaxing 
naturalization standards, it has provided, in theory at least, a significant percentage of this 
population with greater access to the naturalization process.  Indeed, a cursory 
examination of naturalization statistics seems to support this assumption.  After the 
enactment of the Nationality Act in 2000, naturalization figures reached an all-time high 
with 186,700 foreign residents receiving German citizenship.  The naturalization rates of 
178,100 in 2001, 154,000 in 2002 and 140,700 in 2003, compared to the 1997-1999 
average of just under 111,000, unquestionably indicate that the Nationality Act has led to 
13 
a dramatic increase in naturalizations among the foreign resident community. 21  The 
acquisition of citizenship, according to this rationale, grants the immigrant population 
equal standing with the native population by conferring, not only identical civil, political 
and cultural rights, but also a psychological sense of belonging to the German nation.  
Advocates of the new Nationality Act postulate that this leveling of the playing field will 
induce a process of integration by removing the tensions that inherently arise out of an 
unequal distribution of rights.  As a result, the modification of the Nationality Act has the 
potential to alleviate and perhaps eventually even resolve the tensions that characterize 
the relations between German citizens and their foreign resident counterparts. 
This optimistic outlook, however, has been substantially undermined by many 
critics.  It is indeed unquestionable that the naturalization process will grant any eligible 
foreign resident the same rights as any other German citizen.  But, does this equal 
distribution of rights necessarily facilitate the integration process?   What prevents the 
foreign resident community from realizing these rights yet failing to capitalize on the 
opportunities they afford or from simply choosing not to naturalize in the first place?  
Although undoubtedly an important element in the integration process, it proves 
dangerous to equate naturalization with integration.  Additionally, naturalization rates, 
after the initial upsurge in 2001, 2002 and 2003, have decreased to the levels 
commensurate with pre-reform figures, leading many policymakers to question the 
effectiveness of the Nationality Act in producing high and sustained levels of 
                                                
21 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Fewer Naturalizations in 2003,” 
http://www.destatis.de/presse/englisch /pm2004/p2340025.htm (accessed November 6, 2006). 
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naturalization.22  By attempting to observe indicators of the eligibility of this population 
and their utilization of the rights accorded by citizenship it is possible to more accurately 
ascertain the progress of integration in post-2000 Germany.  The research question that 
drives this examination thus focuses on the impact of relaxed naturalization standards on 
the position of immigrants in the cultural, political and economic subsystems of German 
society.  If these legislative reforms do indeed facilitate their desired objective, then this 
process of structural integration should be visible in the convergence of native and 
foreigner positions in these societal sectors.   
1.7- Research Design     
In order to measure the progress of structural integration, this examination will 
rely on various indicators of the position of natives and foreigners in the economic, 
cultural and political subsystems of German society.  This study will begin by examining 
the historical development of immigration and integration policy in Germany to provide a 
context for the assessment of the modern reforms to the Nationality Act.  The study will 
then observe indicators of the eligibility of the foreign resident population to determine 
the feasibility of a widespread process of naturalization.  According to the logic of the 
drafters of the legislation, there should appear a spike in the naturalization rates among 
this community as the relaxed policies make citizenship more easily attainable.   By 
producing this increase in naturalization rates, the legislation is thus intended to facilitate 
a pervasive process of integration.  In order to asses the accuracy of these expectations, 
this study will examine the degree to which increased naturalization rates have resulted in 
                                                
22 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Naturalizations Continue to Decrease in 2005,” July 20, 2006, 
http://www.destatis.de/presse/englisch/pm2006/p2950025.htm (accessed September 20, 2006). 
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structural integration by examining variations in the cultural, political and economic 
positions of natives and foreigners in post-2000 Germany.   
Structural integration represents a composite typology that is composed of a 
cultural, political and economic element, which attempts to incorporate overlapping 
theoretical classifications of integration.  By encompassing “rights and power, status and 
prestige, [and] access to material and immaterial goods,” structural integration covers 
many of the central tenets of various theories of integration.23  It thus provides this 
examination with a comprehensive conceptualization that allows for an accurate 
assessment of the degree of integration of the foreign resident community.  In order to 
measure structural integration, it will be deconstructed into its three composite elements, 
specifically, the position of immigrants in the economic, cultural and political subsystems 
of society.  Although many academic treatments agree with this conceptualization of 
integration, more traditional notions of integration reject this approach.  For those that 
follow the work of T.H. Marshall, for example, integration is simply the attainment of 
social, political and civil rights.24  From this perspective, naturalization, which, by 
definition, confers social, political and civil rights, represents the apex of integration.  
Although this philosophy still has its supporters, the present study will instead rely on 
post-Marshallian logic.  From a post-Marshallian perspective, this conceptualization of 
structural integration provides a competent tool for assessing the actual degree of 
integration of the foreign resident community.   
                                                
23 David May, “Theories of Integration Revisited: Towards an Interactive Model of Integration Strategies,” 
paper presented at the 6th ESA Conference (Murcia, Spain), 6. 
24 T.H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, (Concord, MA: Pluto Press, 1992), 18. 
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 This study will begin by providing a detailed examination of the development of 
German immigration and integration policy over the last half century.  An evaluation of 
these policies establishes a qualitative context for the assessment of contemporary 
reforms to immigration and integration law.  Complimenting this qualitative information, 
an analysis of empirical data then allows for the development of a quantitative context, 
which makes possible a further analysis of the impact of the new Nationality Act on the 
integration of the foreign resident population. This quantitative examination begins by 
looking at the cultural position of immigrants relative to native Germans both in terms of 
their eligibility for naturalization and the possible impact of naturalization on their 
cultural orientation.  These indicators are inherently subjective and include, among 
others, the degree an individual feels German, the extent to which an individual feels 
connected to the country, and the tendency of the individual to speak German.  Again, the 
responses of the foreign resident community will be assessed in terms of eligibility for 
naturalization (when applicable) and convergence with the cultural positions of native 
Germans. This examination will then consider the political position of the foreign 
resident community by observing various relevant indicators, including, but not limited 
to, voting rate, participation in local political initiatives, and interest in German politics to 
determine this population’s eligibility (again, when applicable) and the impact of the 
Nationality Act on their political orientation.  Lastly, the economic position of foreign 
residents in German society provides the final indicator of structural integration.  By 
focusing on the variation of certain economic indicators, such as household income, 
dependence on social assistance programs, and enrollment in various educational and 
17 
training initiatives it becomes possible to assess both the eligibility of the foreign resident 
population for naturalization and the impact of this statute on this population’s economic 
position. If indeed the reforms are catalyzing a process of structural integration, the 
economic position of foreign residents in the years after the enactment of the Nationality 
Act in 2000, as well as their cultural and political positions, should gradually approach 
the economic, cultural and political positions of their native German counterparts.   
  In each of these subsystems of society a convergence of the positions of 
foreigners and natives will indicate a process of structural integration; however, if the 
positions prove static or divergent then it will be difficult to conclude that the legislative 
reforms have produced the intended end-result.  Similarly, if these indicators suggest 
widespread ineligibility among the foreign resident population, the Nationality Act will 
inevitably prove incapable of facilitating the desired process of structural integration.  
Many of these indicators are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel’s (GSOEP) 
annual longitudinal study of a representative segment of German society.25  In addition, 
other data are drawn from various International Social Survey Program (ISSP) modules 
as well as a variety of other sources.26  An analysis of this data makes possible a 
determination of both the eligibility of the foreign resident population for naturalization 
and the relationship between liberalized naturalization standards and the process of 
structural integration in post-2000 Germany.  
 
                                                
25 German Institute for Economic Research, “The German Socio-Economic Panel Study,” German Institute 
for Economic Research, http://www.diw.de/english/sop/, (accessed October 9, 2006). 
26 German Social Science Infrastructure Services, “The International Social Survey Program,” German 
Social Science Infrastructure Services, http://www.gesis. org/en/index.htm, (accessed November 2, 2006). 
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1.8- Potential Limitations of the Paper 
Despite the potential of this study to contribute to the immigration and integration 
literature, there are also several limitations that must be acknowledged.  One of the 
primary issues related to the successful execution of this study relates to the possible 
immaturity of the dataset.  With the Nationality Act passed only six years ago, the 
possibility exists that the relaxed naturalization requirements have simply not had enough 
time to impact the socioeconomic status of the foreign resident population.  Additionally, 
as with any such study, the subjectivity of the subject-matter, specifically such concepts 
as social integration, makes it challenging to construct an appropriate set of proxy 
indicators.  These potential problems, however, do not represent insurmountable 
obstacles.  This examination hopes to avoid such issues through a well-structured and 
careful analysis,    
1.9- Outline of the Paper 
This examination is structured on the basis of five topical chapters.  An 
Introductory Chapter (1) will supply the foundations for the study.  This chapter will 
begin with an Introduction (1.1) that provides an anecdotal prologue to the subject-
matter.  It then proceeds to examine the core concepts of the study by chronicling 
Germany’s Emergence as an Immigration State (1.2), providing a brief history of 
Ethnocultural Identification in Germany (1.3) and examining the Implications of an 
Ethnocultural Heritage (1.4).  The impact of ethnocultural identification on policy 
formation will then be discussed in Recent Policy Responses (1.5).  The paper then 
begins to address the logistical aspects of the examination by establishing a Research 
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Question (1.6) and explicating the Research Design (1.7).  Finally, the chapter addresses 
remaining practical issues by recognizing the Potential Limitations of the Paper (1.8) and 
providing this encapsulating Outline of the Paper (1.9).  Next, the Literature Review (2) 
will begin discussing the relevant scholarly literature by way of a brief Introduction (2.1).  
To provide a framework for the discussion of German citizenship norms, this section will 
then overview the strengths and weaknesses of prominent theories of citizenship, 
including Marshallian Citizenship Theory (2.2), Criticisms of the Marshallian Model 
(2.3), Post-National Membership Theory (2.4), Criticisms of the Post-National 
Membership Model (2.5), and Post-Marshallian Citizenship Theory (2.6).  This 
discussion of the various models of citizenship will also consider the perceptions of 
integration that arise from each of these approaches.  From here, the chapter relates these 
theoretical perspectives back to the initial research question by discussing German 
Citizenship History in a Theoretical Perspective (2.7).  Next, German Citizenship in a 
Qualitative Context (3) discusses the political development of immigration and 
integration issues in Germany.  The chapter examines these issues in a succession of 
chronologically-ordered stages: 1952-1973: A Laissez-Faire Approach (3.2), 1973-1981: 
The Consolidation of the Employment (3.3), 1981-1990: The Emergence of the Foreigner 
Problem (3.4), 1990-1998: An Upsurge in Xenophobic Violence (3.5), and finally, Post-
1998: The New Nationality Act (3.6).  The next chapter, The Nationality Act in a 
Quantitative Context (4), will serve as the most substantive and consequential chapter. 
The Introduction (4.1) lays the groundwork for the chapter by discussing the institutional 
framework established by the Nationality Act.  The chapter then presents the statistical 
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and factual findings of the examination based on topical subsections, specifically Cultural 
Integration (4.1), Political Integration (4.2) and Economic Integration (4.3).  Finally, a 
Conclusion Chapter (5) will examine the implications of the conclusions drawn in the 
previous section.  The chapter begins with anecdotal introduction, The Aftermath of Rütli 
(5.1).  It proceeds to recap some of the important points of the study with Citizenship as 
Social Closure (5.2).  Finally, the chapter recognizes recent developments in German 
foreigner policy, A New Direction in German Immigration Policy (5.3) and concludes 
with a brief set of predictions, The Future of Immigration Policy (5.4).
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Table 1: Foreigners in Germany since 1950 
 
 
Table 2: Length of Residence of Foreign Population 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1- Introduction 
 In order to analyze the impact of the enactment of the Nationality Act in 2000, a 
framework must be established through which citizenship and integration can be 
coherently understood.  A review of the literature reveals three main approaches to 
citizenship.  The particular theoretical framework adopted can have a determining 
influence on the outcome of a study, as the conceptualizations promoted by each school 
vary dramatically.  The traditional approach, first elaborated by T.H. Marshall, 
established an understanding of citizenship that stressed the equalizing tendencies of the 
institution of citizenship.  More recently, however, scholarly voices have begun to 
challenge the Marshallian orthodoxy.  These approaches have attempted to create a 
theory of citizenship that recognizes the new realities of an undeniably globalized world.  
Despite these common foundations, post-Marshallian and post-national thinking, the 
primary counter-movements to traditional Marshallian theory, present distinct 
conceptualizations of citizenship.  The former, in strict opposition to Marshall’s theory, 
establishes citizenship as a mechanism of social exclusion, while the latter, in refutation 
of both these theories, promotes a vision of post-national membership.  An examination 
of the literature reveals that each framework proves both well-adept at addressing specific 
elements of citizenship and ill-equipped to tackle other such elements.  In the unique 
context of the development of German citizenship, however, the post-Marshallian 
conceptualization of citizenship as social closure represents the most appropriate 
framework for the examination of German immigration and integration policies. 
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2.2- Marshallian Citizenship Theory 
Most examinations of citizenship begin with T.H Marshal’s seminal examination 
of the development of citizenship in England.  Marshall’s typology of citizenship 
deconstructs the concept into three constituent parts, the civil element, the political 
element and the social element.  By the civil element Marshall means “the rights 
necessary for individual freedom- liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and 
faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.”1  
The political element means “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as 
a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of 
such a body.”2  Finally, Marshall’s social element covers “the whole range from the right 
to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the 
social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being.”3  For Marshall, citizenship, as “a 
status bestowed on those who are full members of a community,” thus only emerges after 
the development of these constituent rights.4   
Marshall asserts that the formative periods for the development of civil, political 
and social rights can be assigned to the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
respectively.5  The development of the civil element covers a vast array of historical 
events centered on the eighteenth century.   Beginning with the establishment of Habeas 
Corpus, the formative century for the development of civil rights includes the enactment 
                                                
1 T.H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (Concord, MA: Pluto Press, 1992): 8. 
2 Ibid., 8. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid., 18. 
5 Ibid., 13. 
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of the Toleration Act, the abolition of press censorship and the Catholic Emancipation.6  
In the economic realm of the civil element, the eighteenth century also eliminated most 
restrictions on the economic freedom of the individual.7  By the end of the century then, 
civil rights “bore, in most essentials, the appearance that they have today.”8  In a different 
manner, historical developments in the nineteenth century facilitated the expansion of the 
political element.  The Act of 1832, although not producing a significant quantitative 
impact, represented the first steps towards the establishment of a more democratic 
franchise.  This thus paved the way for the liberalizations produced by each successive 
Reform Act and ultimately culminated in the granting of universal suffrage in 1918.9  
Finally, in the twentieth century, the replacement of the Poor Laws with a public welfare 
system, the introduction of wage regulation and the establishment of compulsorily 
elementary education, among other developments, contributed to the advancement of 
social rights in England.10  These historical events produced the successive attainment of 
civil, political and social rights and thus ultimately resulted in the construction of the 
Marshallian concept of citizenship.   
 Marshall’s examination, after detailing the development of these constituent rights 
in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, proceeds to consider the impact of 
this concept of citizenship on social inequality.  The attainment of civil, political and 
social rights serves, for Marshall, to include the individual into these separate spheres of 
society.  Citizenship then essentially represents a general mechanism of inclusion into 
                                                
6 Ibid., 10. 
7 Ibid., 11. 
8 Ibid., 10. 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Ibid., 15. 
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society.  According to Marshall’s theory, “the preservation of economic inequalities has 
been made more difficult by the enrichment of the status of citizenship” as citizenship 
breaks down the boundaries that have typically served as delineators of social class.11 
Since all who enjoy this status now possess the same entitlements and obligations, 
citizenship both fosters social equality and acts as a mechanism of inclusion into the 
societal community.12   
 Marshall’s examination of the development of citizenship in England represents 
an influential work of citizenship theory and has thus provoked support and criticism 
alike.  Recently, the academic consensus has notably shifted away from Marshall’s 
traditional perspective, as many scholars have attempted to construct a framework that 
better incorporates the new realities of a globalized age.  David Held, however, provides 
a stalwart defense of Marshallian theory.  While comparing the merits of Marshall’s view 
with a more contemporaneous approach, Held concludes that Marshallian logic still 
proves adept at understanding the intricacies of citizenship.  At the beginning of his 
essay, Held recognizes that “Marshall’s discussion is explicitly focused on Britain and, 
although he sometimes generalized beyond this context, he does not claim that his 
argument can be applied with equal cogency to other countries.”13  This qualification 
allows him to reject particular elements of Marshall’s theory without necessarily rejecting 
his conclusion en masse.  Held begins his work by defining citizenship in Marshallian 
terms: “citizenship has meant a certain reciprocity of rights against, and duties towards, 
                                                
11 Ibid., 45. 
12 Ibid., 18. 
13 David Held, ‘Citizenship and Autonomy” in Political Theory in the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1984): 190. 
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the community…citizenship has entailed membership, membership of the community in 
which one lives one’s life.”14  In a similar way to Marshall, Held asserts that this 
equalization of rights means that “the preservation of economic inequalities has been 
made more difficult.”15  As a result, class distinctions, while not completely absent, have 
been greatly weakened by the expansion of citizenship rights and the subsequent 
moderation of economic inequality.  Despite his agreement with Marshall’s approach, 
however, Held asserts that “the post-Marshall debate needs to extend the analysis of 
citizenship to take account of issues posed by, for instance, feminism, the black 
movement, ecology and those who have advocated the rights of children.”16  Although he 
resolutely concurs with Marshall’s definition of citizenship as membership in a 
community and accepts citizenship’s moderating effects on social inequality, he 
ultimately concludes that “a satisfactory account of the meaning and nature of citizenship 
today must transcend the terms of reference which Marshall has set down.”17  Even for 
the defenders of Marshall, such as Held, the Marshallian approach, while still valuable, 
can not adequately address the complexities of modern citizenship.    
The Marshallian approach views citizenship as the development of successive 
categories of rights.  The attainment of full citizenship and thus integration, according to 
Marshallian logic, only occurs once an individual secures civil, political, and social 
rights.  This delineation of rights, however, fails to consider the cultural aspect of 
integration.  Although an immigrant may secure civil, political and social rights, the 
                                                
14 Ibid,. 100. 
15 Ibid., 192. 
16 Ibid., 199. 
17 Ibid,. 202. 
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unwillingness of the native community to recognize the legitimacy of these rights and/or 
the reluctance of the immigrant community to embrace them can effectively forestall the 
integration process.  Naturalization, the formalistic granting of civil, political and social 
rights to an individual, does not, therefore, guaranty integration into society.  If 
immigrants and natives in the receiving state lack the proper norms and behavior, the 
equal access guaranteed by citizenship (civil, political and social rights) will be severely 
circumscribed by engrained beliefs and biases.  Despite such limitations, integration for 
the true Marshallian is based on this particular perception of incorporation and therefore 
only serves as a measure of civil, political, and social incorporation not of actual 
structural integration.   
2.3- Criticisms of the Marshallian Citizenship Model 
 The critics of Marshall’s work essentially argue that the institution of citizenship 
no longer serves as an instrument of social equality.  For natives of any given state, 
Marshall’s approach proves an effective means of concretely defining citizenship.  The 
increase of migratory flows during the era of globalization, however, has complicated 
such traditionalist conceptions of citizenship.18  The influx of immigrants necessitates 
that citizenship be considered from both native and migrant perspectives.  Although the 
perspective of the native may mirror Marshal’s conceptualization, this definition proves 
incapable of incorporating the immigrants’ perception of citizenship.19 Indeed, 
citizenship, far from acting as a mechanism of inclusion, “has been seen as an instrument 
and object of social closure; both a marker of membership and a scare good to which 
                                                
18 Joppke, “How Immigration is Changing Citizenship,” 630. 
19 Halfmann, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany,” 266. 
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access is sought and restricted.”20  From this perspective, the political exclusion of the 
immigrant population derives from the granting of citizenship rights to the deprived 
native social classes, the very “process which Marshall believed would lead modern 
society toward more equality.”21  This process is only exacerbated by the expansive 
European welfare systems that have led to a noticeable differentiation of the rights 
enjoyed by citizens and non-citizens.  By sharply delineating the rights of the native 
citizen population from the foreign non-citizen population, the welfare state has actually 
led to greater inequality.22  The criticisms of post-Marshallian scholars thus primarily 
focus on the inability of Marshall’s citizenship to address the complexities introduced by 
the influx and incorporation of immigrants into society during the age of globalization.   
 In addition to post-Marshallian scholars, a different type of criticism has been 
voiced by a small group of post-national scholars.   Yasemine Soysal, the leading 
proponent of this approach, asserts that the concept of citizenship has become outdated.  
With a global human rights regime, the governments of many states have been pressured 
from various outside influences to institute policies that reflect international human rights 
norms.  As a result, the gap between the rights accorded to non-citizens and the rights 
accorded to citizens no longer represents a significant source of inequity.  From this 
perspective, Marshall’s attempt to establish a relationship between citizenship and social 
class thus proves largely obsolete.  If states have indeed instituted international human 
rights norms, not only does citizenship no longer serve as the primary facilitator of the 
                                                
20 Lydia Morris, “Rights and Controls in the Management of Migration: The Case of Germany,” The 
Sociological Review (2000): 225 
21 Halfmann, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany,” 266. 
22 Ibid., 267. 
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equalization of rights, but the issue of social inequality no longer proves tethered to the 
question of citizenship.  Although the seminal work of citizenship literature, proponents 
and critics alike have recognized the need to either further develop Marshall’s theory in 
the light of the globalized era or to construct an entirely new approach that proves better 
adapted to the complexities of this new world order. 
2.4- Post-National Membership Theory 
In contrast to Marshallian conceptions of citizenship, post-national scholars have, 
as mentioned above, attempted to establish the peripheral nature of citizenship in the 
context of a world system dominated by international regimes rather than individual 
nation-states.  Soysal, the main proponent of this theory, suggests that “post-national 
membership,” essentially the guarantee of universal human rights to immigrants despite 
citizenship status, has stripped traditional state citizenship of its importance.23  Soysal 
builds her argument from the Marshallian proposition that citizenship and its concomitant 
rights undergo a gradual universalization as it is reconfigured during different stages of 
history. 24  This “universalizing movement has made exclusions based on any criteria of 
ascribed status incompatible with the institution of citizenship.”25  From a Marshallian 
perspective, this process, however, must be limited to the eradication of exclusions based 
on any criteria of ascribed status for citizens of a particular state.  As a result, Soysal’s 
construction of post-national citizenship necessarily refutes the basic tenets of Marshall’s 
model of national citizenship. 
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25 Ibid,. 
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Indeed, for Soysal, “the incorporation of guestworkers [her primary case study] is 
no mere expansion of the scope of national citizenship . . . rather, it reveals a profound 
transformation in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional logic and in the 
way it is legitimated.”26  The foundations of post-national citizenship are thus located 
beyond the confines of the nation-state.   As a result, the congruence between 
membership and territory is no longer identical as in the national citizenship model.  
Since “in the post-national model, the boundaries of membership are fluid” there arises 
an unavoidable distinction between territory and membership.27  In addition, post-
national membership “implies multiplicity of membership.”28  This multiplicity thus 
makes it possible to distinguish between various groups of migrants.  Unlike the 
traditional Marshallian conception of citizenship, this allows for an unequal distribution 
of rights, as “certain groups of migrants are more privileged than others.”29  Despite the 
lack of uniformity in the distribution of rights, Soysal maintains that the entitlement of 
migrant groups to some rights has led to the emergence of a more globally-oriented 
conception of citizenship.  She contends that in this new post-national citizenship model, 
“universal personhood replaces nationhood; and universal human rights replace national 
rights.”30  This model thus obtains its authority from entirely extra-national sources.  As 
Soysal notes, “post-national membership derives its force and legitimacy from changes in 
the transnational order that defines the rules and organization of the nation-state 
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system.”31  Although the state still serves the vital function of providing and 
implementing rights, both the types of rights implemented and the types of recipients 
enjoying them are largely dictated by global institutions.   In her study of the guestworker 
populations in various European states, Soysal asserts that “a dense set of interactions 
facilitated by inter- and transitional market and security arrangements (NATO, the EC, 
and the UN system) constrain the host states from dispensing with their migrant 
populations at will.”32  While implementing various rights, the nation-state must then 
defer to these institutions for basic ground rules and guidelines.  For these states, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as various other international 
treaties, conventions, charters, and recommendations, provide the normative foundations 
for the implementation of rights.33  Locked in by these global norms, a state’s granting of 
rights must conform to the standards established by these institutions.  Soysal insists “the 
rights defined and codified assure not just the economic, civil, and social rights of 
individual migrants . . . but also the cultural rights of migrant groups as collectives.”34  As 
a result, the norms established by transnational and international institutions and the 
state’s obligation to respect these norms have led to the emergence of a post-national 
form of citizenship.   
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2.5- Criticisms of the Post-National Membership Model 
As Christian Joppke notes, in the former West Germany the integration of 
guestworkers was characterized, in part, by “post-national membership, in which the 
universal human rights provisions of the Basic Law endowed settled foreigners with most 
of the rights and privileges that Germans enjoyed.”35  This post-national membership, 
however, “allowed the maintenance of ethnic citizenship,” which, in turn, led to the 
development of a stratified society.36  In addition, despite their post-national membership 
status, guestworkers, particularly in Germany, have been unable to improve their 
socioeconomic status.   With post-national citizenship maintaining old divisions and 
failing to mend social disparities, Joppke concludes that “national citizenship remains 
indispensable for immigrant integration.”37  Although the emergence of post-national 
membership has cushioned the shock of immigration for first-generation immigrants by 
providing certain entitlements, it has only served to reinforce the alienation of future 
generations.  As Joppke asserts, “post-national membership is an asset for first-generation 
immigrants . . .[but] it becomes a liability for second- and third generation immigrants, 
whose home is the receiving society, but whose lasting exclusion from its national 
community makes them vulnerable and stigmatized minorities.”38  Indeed, it is hard to 
deny that the continued marginalization of later generation foreign residents in Germany 
has reinforced the significance of citizenship in the post-War Germany.   
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2.6- Post-Marshallian Citizenship Theory 
For the post-Marshallian scholar, the incompatibility of Marshallian citizenship 
with increased migratory flows necessitated a redefinition of this traditional concept. 
Brubaker, in the foundational work of this school, establishes citizenship as “both an 
instrument and object of social closure.”39  This departure from the Marshallian 
convention derives from his assertion that “there is a conceptually clear, legally 
consequential, and ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners.”40  
By his “conceptually clear” language, Brubaker means that there exist well-established 
norms that both distinguish the non-citizen population and justify this distinction.  In 
modern democratic states, sovereignty is said to derive from the consent of that particular 
states bounded citizenry.  Since these modern democratic states are, or at least claim to 
be, nation-states, the state thus exists “‘of’ and ‘for’ a particular, distinctive, bounded 
nation.”41  When a state attempts to “express the will and further the interests of [its] 
citizenry,” it is therefore acting solely for the benefit of the particular state’s nation and, 
as a result, with neglect for any individual outside of this exclusive grouping.42  This 
conceptual distinction, though, also has important practical ramifications.  In terms of 
“legally consequential” impacts, Brubaker recognizes the monopoly enjoyed by the state 
over nearly every key institution.  By managing access to institutions, such as admission 
to and exit from the territory, the right to universal suffrage and the ability to engage in 
military service, the state has the ability shape the fate of the non-citizen population 
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through a regulation of citizenship requirements.43  The impact of the conceptual 
distinction, though, goes far beyond the practical consequences produced by the legal 
status of citizenship.  Indeed, the “ideologically charged” nature of this distinction adds 
additional significance to this conception of citizenship.  Although much of this 
ideological dimension derives from the national/non-national distinction, it is further 
reinforced by insider outsider tensions.  Indeed, as Brubaker notes, “formal closure 
against legal non-citizens may overlap in practice with informal closure against 
ethnocultural non-nationals.”44  In states with strong ethnocultural traditions especially, 
the line between ethnocultural citizens and ethnocultural non-citizens thus becomes 
practically imperceptible.  As a result, those individuals that find themselves outsiders in 
terms of citizenship status or ethnocultural identity often differ only to the extent of the 
formality of their exclusion.  Although citizenship “is everywhere an instrument and 
object of social closure,” Brubaker recognizes that the acquisition of citizenship by a 
formally excluded individual does not necessitate immediate or even eventual inclusion 
into society.45  
Brubaker’s work has provided the foundations for the whole post-Marshallian 
movement by redefining citizenship as a mechanism of social exclusion rather than social 
inclusion.  Following this path, Halfmann illustrates that Marshall’s definition fails to 
consider the perspective of the state, which views citizenship strictly as a form of legal 
membership that serves to limit access to certain entitlements.  In addition, the iniquitous 
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ramifications of granting welfare entitlements to deprived citizens while withholding 
them from such non-citizens fundamentally excludes certain residents.46  For both a state 
intent on preserving its limited resources and the non-citizen population deprived of these 
basic rights, the inclusiveness of citizenship thus derives from a desire for exclusivity.  
For Halfmann then, citizenship means a “legal institution for regulating membership in a 
state,” rather than active participation in a national community.47 
Similarly, the increasing interconnectedness of the globalized era, specifically in 
terms of human capital, leads Morris to question the applicability of the traditional 
Marshallian understanding of citizenship.  In fact, “state control over the granting and 
withholding of rights is a key component in the management of migration.”48  
Immigration has thus lead to the transformation of the understanding of citizenship from 
an instrument of societal inclusion to a mechanism for controlling the distribution of 
rights to the resident population.  As a result, Morris concludes that the reluctance to 
extend citizenship to certain populations has resulted in “a system of inequalities 
structured by rights granted or withheld by the state.”49  She thus asserts that citizenship 
now serves the express purpose of excluding designated populations from certain 
entitlements in the interest of preserving the state’s limited resources. 
Joppke likewise rejects Marshallian citizenship since “the movement of people 
across states revealed that citizenship is not only a set of rights, but also a mechanism of 
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closure that sharply demarcates the boundaries of states.”50  Because of the ability of 
citizenship to include and exclude individuals, Joppke asserts the continued centrality of 
national citizenship for the integration of immigrant communities.51  Essentially, post-
Marshallians argue that the institution of citizenship no longer serves as an instrument of 
social equality.  Citizenship instead represents a mechanism of social closure, since 
“there is a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged distinction 
between citizens and foreigners.”52  With the state claiming to express the will of its 
citizens, the actions of the state aim at furthering the interests of this limited citizenry, 
which, consequentially, produces a systematic disregard for the needs of the foreign 
population. 
Unlike the Marshallian approach, post-Marshallian integration theory includes a 
consideration of the cultural factor.  The addition of this separate cultural element appears 
repeatedly in the post-Marshallian literature.  Halfmann’s study, for example, uses a 
breakdown that recognizes the necessity of political, cultural, and economic integration, 
although cultural inclusion appears in his examination of the self-identification of the 
immigrant as a member of the nation.53  Micahel Fertig, following much the same path, 
utilizes a variety of qualitative information, essentially measures of economic and 
political integration, and subjective data, or measures of the more relative process of 
cultural inclusion.54 Similarly, a report by the German Federal Office of Migration and 
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Refugees states that a facilitation of integration requires both cultural (a better 
understanding of German culture by the immigrant population) and economic and 
political reforms (improving educational attainment and qualification levels of the 
immigrant population and encouraging political participation).55  In a study of immigrant 
integration in Belgium, Phalet and Swyngedouw discuss measures of the cultural, 
political and socioeconomic dimensions of integration.56 Their study thus considers 
cultural, political and economic inclusion.  Additionally, David May, in attempting to 
construct a meaningful way to order the various dimensions of immigrant integration, 
concludes that breakdowns with cultural, political and economic elements “can be found 
in the literature in many different variants.”57   
2.7- German Immigration History in a Theoretical Perspective 
As ideal types none of these competing theoretical approaches can accurately 
describe the true nature of citizenship and immigration in a complex modern polity such 
as Germany.  The challenge thus arises to determine which approach most accurately 
captures the status and function of citizenship in the country both historically and 
contemporaneously.  In order to assess the applicability of these approaches, a brief 
overview of the history of immigration to Germany proves necessary.  By analyzing this 
history, it proves possible to reveal the traditional relationship between immigration and 
citizenship in the German state system.  The precise nature of this relationship, in turn, 
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allows for a determination of the most appropriate conceptualization of citizenship and 
integration for the purposes of this study. 
For centuries Germany has explicitly denied being a country of immigration.  
Only recently, particularly after the reunification of the country, did policymakers begin 
to unambiguously accept this controversial reality.  Despite only a recent 
acknowledgment of this status, many scholars note that German history has traditionally 
been characterized by large inflows of migrant laborers.58  Large-scale immigration to 
Germany, as in most countries, has resulted in the development of an ambivalent attitude 
towards immigration.  In this context, early policies, specifically descent-based 
citizenship regimes, expressly attempted to exclude the immigrant population from 
formal inclusion in the state system.  The unexpected ramifications of these systems, 
however, led to the institution of an ethnically-based conception of citizenship in 
Germany.  Although ethnic citizenship standards represented above all a practical attempt 
to address the shortcomings of descent-based measures, they effectively maintained the 
exclusivist tendencies of the old descent-based systems.  The remarkable resiliency of 
this ethnocultural understanding of citizenship, though the result of pure geopolitical 
coincidence, gradually led to the institutionalization of these ethnic standards of 
citizenship.  In this context, the relationship between immigration and citizenship in 
Germany has necessarily resulted in the persistent exclusion of the migrant population.    
 Beginning as early as the seventeenth century, Germany has consistently been the 
recipient of a vast number of immigrants from various states.  As early as 1640, a large 
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number of migrants of Swiss origin immigrated to Germany.  These immigrants were 
followed closely by waves of French Huguenots attempting to escape persecution.  Such 
religiously-motivated migrations, however, represented only a small segment of the 
larger process of immigration to Germany during the seventeenth century.  Indeed, after 
the Thirty Years War devastated all of central Europe, massive population loses within 
Germany opened up jobs and land and attracted steady streams of migrants to the warn-
torn country.   As a result, during the second half of the seventeenth century, an 
enormous amount of individuals migrated to Germany, including 40,000 Austrians, 
150,000 Bohemians, 43,000 Huguenots, 50,000 Swiss, and a smaller number of various 
other nationalities.59  From early on, immigration has thus represented a consistent 
feature of the German state system.   
This massive influx of immigrants was not a unique feature of the seventeenth 
century.  Rather, similar population movements also characterized much of the eighteenth 
century.60  Spurred by the proclamation of religious toleration by Frederick the Great 
during the middle of century, religious refugees flocked to Germany in order to escape 
persecution.  In addition, the industrialization and economic development that 
characterized Germany during this era demanded a drastic increase in laborers and thus 
led to the unprecedented surge in immigration levels towards the end of the century.61  In 
response, “the German Reich instituted a system of control designed to turn potentially 
permanent immigration into a temporary phenomenon.”62  This simultaneous demand for 
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and rejection of foreign labor represents the first appearance of a reoccurring motif in the 
traditional management of immigration to Germany.   
Nineteenth century approaches to immigration were marked by this same peculiar 
ambivalence.  Various German states, for instance, attempted to establish citizenship 
restrictions that would prevent immigration (although sorely needed) from becoming a 
permanent phenomenon.  In 1842 Prussia codified, for the first time, a citizenship regime 
based entirely on descent.63  The precedent established by the Prussian law of 1842 was 
subsequently followed by similar legislation in a variety of other German states.  An act 
passed in 1870 by the North German Confederation, for instance, established direct 
descent as the only means of acquiring citizenship.64  The purpose of these laws was to 
clarify the inclusion or exclusion of certain individuals from the German polity.  With 
approximately 950,000 foreign laborers residing in Germany by 1907, the foreign 
population was beginning to threaten traditional understandings of the German nation.65    
While these legislative actions did effectively exclude the immigrant population, “the 
addition of descent as the basis of citizenship,” however, “was not a panacea.”66  Indeed, 
with the new citizenship regime determining descent based on continuous residence of 
both parents within the state territory, it led to the denationalization of a portion of ethnic 
Germans in addition to the targeted class of foreign laborers. 
In response to the unexpected impact of the descent-based systems, the German 
Empire enacted the Imperial and State Citizenship Act of 1913, which represented the 
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first official immigration policy of the unified German state.  The passage of this law 
represented both “an attempt to minimize the loss citizenship” for ethnic Germans and an 
implicit reinforcement of the systematic exclusion of the foreign population.67  As a 
result, the Citizenship Act of 1913, like the descent-based systems before it, 
institutionally excluded the immigrant population from the German state.  Despite the 
exclusivist tendencies of this statute, it would remain in force until 1999 due to the 
unique geopolitical concerns of Germany during the twentieth century (specifically, it 
provided legal justification for accepting ethnic German refuges from the Soviet bloc 
during the Cold War).  Although maintained for pragmatic purposes, modern German 
citizenship policy, which evolved directly from descent-based measures, retained 
naturalization standards that explicitly stemmed from the desire to exclude immigrants 
from the German polity.  
 The remarkable resiliency of ethnocultural citizenship standards in Germany 
ultimately led to the institutionalization of exclusivist norms of state membership.  At the 
same time, however, the new political and economic realities of the twentieth century 
demanded the importation of foreign labor to Germany.  These contradictory forces thus 
reinforced the “long-standing German tension between the desires for cheap foreign labor 
as well as an ethnically pure culture.”68 
 As early as the beginning of the twentieth century “German employers . . . 
recognized the economic advantages of the instrumental employment of foreigners.”69  
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The outbreak of World War I in 1914 represented the first major application of this 
economic philosophy.  “Throughout the war some 500,000 to 600,000 forced laborers 
were recruited from occupied Russian territory” to replace the German workers sent to 
the front.70  After the war, however, Germany, informed by engrained ethnocultural 
norms, forced the majority of these replacement workers to leave the country.  This 
outflow evoked protests from both agriculture and industry alike, as both sectors thrived 
on the easily-manipulated and cheaply-compensated labor provided by foreign 
migrants.71  Ultimately, however, popular sentiments of ethnic identification largely 
drowned out the more practically-minded economic concerns of these sectors.   
Since Germany had systemically excluded its immigrant population, by the time 
“the Nazis came to power in 1933 the foreign population was [again] marginal.”72  The 
Nazis’ rapid rearming of the German military, however, produced yet another upsurge in 
foreign labor recruitment.   This demand resulted in an influx of migrants, who “were 
again employed and treated as temporary foreign labor possessing only limited rights.”73  
“By the end of the war at least 25 percent of those employed in the German economy 
were foreigners,” with the total immigrant population amounting to around 7 million.74  
Despite this high concentration of foreigners in Germany immediately following the War, 
the domestic situation during this period produced a high degree of labor mobility, as 
refugees and expellees returned and prisoners of war and forced laborers emigrated.  As a 
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result of this mass exodus, Germany again experienced a rapid deterioration of its 
valuable corps of foreign laborers.   
 This mass emigration, combined with the devastating effects of the War on the 
German workforce, once more necessitated massive foreign labor recruitment in 
Germany.75  With the rapid expansion of the German economy in the early 1950s, “the 
demand for labor rose substantially and government officials projected that foreign labor 
recruitment would be necessary to maintain the expansion.”76  The labor provided by 
bilateral recruitment treaties therefore provided the manpower necessary to fuel the so-
called German economic miracle. The unparalleled growth of the German economy 
during this period thus verified for many that “foreign labor was both necessary and 
profitable.”77  Again, however, ethnocultural citizenship norms prevented the official 
incorporation of this population.  Indeed, the German government, although pointing to 
the OPEC oil embargo, terminated recruitment programs in 1973 as an attempt to enforce 
these exclusivist citizenship norms. 78   
As in the past, economic utility and cultural purity promoted contradictory 
approaches to the management of immigration in Germany.  While economic 
justifications continued to demand the recruitment of foreign laborers, ethnocultural 
citizenship norms incessantly called for the establishment of an ethnically homogenous 
German nation-state.  The institutionalization of ethnocultural norms and the increased 
demand for foreign labor in contemporary Germany has engrained these tensions in the 
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present-day debate over immigration and citizenship.  With poignant allusions to the 
German nation consistently trumping economic pragmatism, the foreign resident 
population has been systematically excluded from the German polity.  The historical 
utilization of state membership as a means of exclusion in Germany exemplifies post-
Marshallian conceptualizations of citizenship.  This study thus relies on this framework 
in attempting to determine the impact of the enactment of the Nationality Act of 1999 on 
the structural integration of Germany’s foreign resident population.    
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Chapter 3: The Nationality Act in a Qualitative Context 
3.1- Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of 
prominent theories of citizenship.  In the context of the historical relationship between 
citizenship and immigration in Germany, post-Marshallian conceptions of citizenship 
provide the most appropriate framework for assessing the current nature of this 
relationship.  As noted in the previous chapter, the Federal Republic of Germany, long 
before its consolidation into a modern nation-state, experienced population movements of 
various sizes, from diverse origins and with assorted ambitions.  As in most states, the 
growth in the foreign population in Germany resulted in the development of an 
ambivalent approach to the management of immigration.  While economic pragmatists 
continuously recognized immigration as the key to economic growth in the country, 
national purists identified the exclusion of the foreign population as essential to the 
preservation of the German nation and the maintenance of societal stability.  Throughout 
the history of the management of immigration to Germany, the poignancy of the national 
argument has consistently trumped the sensibility of the economic argument.  
Immigration policies, as a result, have consistently relied on an ethnocultural construction 
of German citizenship to exclude the immigrant population from official membership in 
the state system.  The resiliency of the Citizenship Act of 1913 gradually institutionalized 
these ethnocultural citizenship norms.  In this context, citizenship, as an ethnic marker, 
has systematically prevented the inclusion of the foreign population in the German polity.  
The traditional relationship between immigration and citizenship in Germany therefore 
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exemplifies the post-Marshallian conceptualization of citizenship as both an object and 
instrument of social closure.   
In the framework of post-Marshallian citizenship theory, this chapter qualitatively 
examines the impact of this conception of citizenship on the construction of immigration 
and integration policy in Germany.  By observing the major policy developments since 
the beginning of the post-War migrations in the early 1950s, this chapter allows for the 
establishment of a qualitative context for the examination of the integration of the foreign 
resident population.  Although post-Marshallian citizenship theory unquestionably 
characterizes the theoretical nature of German foreigner policy, significant immigration 
and integration policies and events act as the principle vehicles through which theoretical 
understandings are practically articulated.  For the present evaluation of the Nationality 
Act of 1999, the practical manifestations of German immigration and integration policy, 
as opposed to their theoretical underpinnings, provide the qualitative context for the 
assessment of the progress of the integration of the foreign resident population.  
Specifically, this context provides the quantitative analysis of the following chapter with 
the framework required for an informed analysis of the impact of the new Nationality 
Act.   
3.2- 1952-1973: A Laissez-Faire Approach 
 This period created the basic foundations for the eventual emergence of 
immigration as both an important practical concern and a heated political issue.  During 
this twenty-year phase, Germany unquestionably experienced the most influential period 
of immigration in its history.  In order to reconstruct the German economy and 
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infrastructure after the devastation of World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany 
pursued a program of extensive low-skill foreign labor recruitment in the post-War 
years.1  Accordingly, Germany secured labor recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), 
Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), Tunisia and Morocco (1965) 
and Yugoslavia (1968).2  Guestworkers from these countries entered Germany under the 
terms of various labor contracts that stipulated a particular, although always abbreviated, 
window for employment, typically as short as one or two years.  A rotation principle, 
which in theory obliged immigrants with expired work contracts to emigrate, was put in 
place to ensure that this immigration represented only a temporary phenomenon.  “The 
planned rotation principle… [however], “was not continued in practice for long.”3  As a 
result, of the some 14 million foreign workers that came to Germany during this period of 
recruitment only about 11 million ever emigrated in accordance with the rotation 
principle (the residual 3 million immigrants represented more than 5 per cent of 
Germany’s 1973 population).4  With the rotation principle failing to regulate the 
residency of the immigrant population, the ostensibly temporary phenomenon of foreign 
labor recruitment quickly began to assume a more permanent nature.  
 The perception of foreign labor recruitment in this era as a temporary 
phenomenon largely shaped the initial discourse on immigration and integration in 
Germany.  During this period, as the German Federal Office of Migration and Refugees 
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has noted, “German integration policy was characterized by a ‘laissez-faire-approach.”5  
When recruitment began in 1955, German policymakers had assumed that recruited 
foreign laborers would simply return to their respective countries of origin after their 
working contracts expired.  In this context, immigrants were logically viewed as 
temporary denizens with a specific economic purpose.  Promotional campaigns aimed at 
selling the recruitment programs coaxed the German public into accepting these policies 
precisely by reference to this perception.  These campaigns claimed that foreign laborers 
would boost economic progress, facilitate growth, replace men lost during the War and, 
most importantly, leave during times of economic recession.6  With the immigrant 
population both portrayed and treated as expendable instruments of economic 
development, “a comprehensive integration policy was not deemed necessary.”7   
Since immigration was viewed as a temporary phenomenon, Germany enacted 
neither a specific policy on foreigners nor any identifiable integration measures.8  With 
the ineffectiveness of the rotation principle and the increasing inclination of immigrants 
to remain in Germany, however, the absence of any overarching immigration or 
integration polices soon became a glaring problem.  The economic recession of the early 
1970s not only led to a predictable decrease in the demand for foreign labor but also to a 
less predictable increase in anti-foreigner sentiments.  Economic scapegoating, combined 
with the increasing unavoidability of the permanency of the immigrant population, 
critically challenged the German government’s subscription to a laissez-faire 
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management of immigration.9  As it became increasingly obvious that many of these so-
called guestworkers were intent on a more permanent type of residency, the emerging 
foreign resident population began to challenge engrained ethnocultural understandings of 
the German nation-state. The first attempt to regulate the immigrant population, 
specifically the Foreigners Law of 1965, reflected the concerns inherent in ethnocultural 
ideology.  In relevant part, the statute stated that work permits will be provided “only if 
the presence of the foreigner does not damage the interests of the Federal Republic.”10  
Although at the beginning of this period guestworkers represented a desirable economic 
instrument, by the early 1970s, due largely to domestic economic stagnation, this 
population was instead perceived as a source of societal instability.   
 This twenty year span represents a seminal chapter in the development of the 
immigration and integration debate in Germany.  Not only did policies during this era 
lead to the establishment of a permanent immigrant population, but, perhaps more 
importantly, they established a pattern of exclusion that would characterize the treatment 
of foreigners in Germany for decades to come.  By viewing immigrants merely as 
temporary economic agents, Germany failed to develop any effective means of managing 
the emerging foreign resident population.  Informed primarily by an ethnocultural 
conception of German nationhood, a laissez-faire approach instead characterized the 
management of the foreign population during this era.  With this hands-off approach 
combining with ethnic standards of identification in Germany, this early treatment of the 
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guestworker population led to the institutionalization of exclusivist foreigner policies in 
Germany.   
3.3- 1973-1981: The Consolidation of Employment  
 The second phase of German immigration policy was defined by the imposition of 
legal restrictions upon the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country.  The 1973 
oil crisis and the economic recession that followed served as the official justification for 
Germany’s ban on labor recruitment in November of 1973.  “However, the economic 
argument only disguised the more profound official unease with the social and political 
problems which immigration had already created and which [many feared] would get 
worse if it was allowed to continue unhindered.”11  In light of these concerns, Germany 
“pursued a policy of the ‘consolidation of the employment of foreigners” after the official 
ban on foreign labor recruitment.12  The objective of this policy was to both encourage 
the emigration of foreign employees and to support the integration (read assimilation) of 
the remaining foreign resident population.13   
On the one hand, this led the federal government to offer the foreign population 
various inducements to leave the country.  On the other hand, however, this produced a 
slightly more hospitable situation for the foreign resident population.14  During this 
decade, important federal court decisions began to assure the constitutional rights of this 
population.  The Arab Case (1973) and the Indian Case (1978), for instance, “secured the 
residence rights of de-facto immigrants” by reducing the absolute discretion that state 
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agencies had enjoyed over the granting of work and residency permits.15  Federal policies 
also, by easing restrictions on family reunification policies, allowed many guestworkers 
to bring their families to Germany.  Additionally, the official termination of the rotation 
system, combined with the new ban on foreign labor recruitment, meant that the current 
rotation of foreign workers was an indispensable asset for the German economy.16  These 
conditions intended to induce the settlement and assimilation of the marginalized 
guestworker community into mainstream German society.  Despite such efforts, many 
politicians, such as Hans Filbinger, the Governing Mayor of Baden-Württemberg, 
continued to demand the return of the foreign worker population to their countries of 
origin in line with the now defunct rotation principle.17  In defense of these more 
hospitable foreigner policies, however, trade unions along with opposition parties 
asserted that emigration, by replacing experienced workers with new recruits, represented 
an entirely “uneconomical” process.18  Economic common-sense, combined with failed 
attempts to assimilate the guestworker population, meant that “by the late 1970s 
Germany had effectively become an immigration country.”19 
 Despite Germany’s refusal to accept its de facto immigration status, the shifting 
demographic reality in the country demanded political attention.  Although more 
hospitable foreigner policies were aimed at assimilating the guestworker population and 
thus maintaining the country’s non-immigration status, these policies, combined with 
continued economic demand, reinforced the visibility and influence of the foreign 
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resident community.  As a result, by the end of this period, around 4.4 million foreigners 
(over 7 per cent of the total population) were permanently residing in Germany.20  After 
the failure of efforts to assimilate this population, however, many thought that the 
dramatic transformation of German society “would plunge the country into social 
conflicts.”21  Indeed, with the economic problems produced by the oil shock of 1973, the 
realization of the permanent as opposed to temporary nature of the guestworker 
population, and the increasingly non-European composition of this population, this period 
did eventually witness an alarming increase in xenophobic and racist confrontations.22 
 In response to the destabilization that that the growing tensions between the native 
German and foreign resident communities produced, several attempts were made to ease 
the relations between these populations.  Many of these policies advocated integration 
(assimilation in the ethnocultural context of the era) as the key to societal stability.  While 
the initial German reaction to this situation “consisted of the attempt to strengthen the 
recruitment ban in 1974,” this policy was quickly rescinded due to utter ineffectiveness.23  
As a result, the focus instead shifted towards integration.  To administer this process 
Germany thus created the post of Ombudsman for the Advancement of the Integration of 
Foreign Workers and their Families on December 1, 1978.24  Heinz Kühn, the first 
occupant of this post, published the Kühn Memorandum in 1979, which called for a 
number of very progressive and liberal integration policies.25  Intent on genuinely 
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integrating, as opposed to coercively assimilating, second generation foreign residents, 
Kühn proposed several progressive policies, including extending the franchise to 
foreigners born in Germany and providing the children of Muslim immigrant families 
with lectures on Islam at school.26  Unfortunately, however, the incompatibility of these 
progressive policies with ethnocultural norms ultimately prevented the enactment of 
nearly all of Kühn’s proposals.27  This episode, by exemplifying the difficulty of 
reconciling foreigner issues with the maintenance of an ethnic understanding of 
nationhood, “conveyed an early insight into the difficulties of a country not 
acknowledging its de-facto immigration situation.”28   
   By the end of this period, the attempted consolidation of the employment of 
foreigners had become increasingly untenable.  Although ethnocultural attitudes 
demanded the emigration of the foreign resident population, the economic utility of 
foreign labor combined with ineffective assimilation policies to produce a permanent 
foreign resident population.  This new reality forced policymakers to shift their focus 
from emigration towards renewed efforts of assimilation.  Assimilationist policies, such 
as family reunification, however, promoted the growth and permanency of the foreign 
resident population.  Meanwhile, more authentic efforts to integrate the foreign 
population, such as the formation of federal foreigner’s commissions, proved incapable 
of overcoming engrained ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood in Germany.  While 
simple economics and failed assimilation measures guaranteed the continued presence of 
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a significant foreign resident community in Germany, the unwillingness of the federal 
government to accept its de facto immigration status ultimately prevented the successful 
integration of this population.  As a result, the consistent exclusion of this population 
from mainstream German society has resulted in the creation of a noticeable disparity 
between the privileged ethnic German majority and the disenfranchised foreign resident 
minority.  This dynamic, while establishing an uneasy relationship between these two 
communities, has also laid the foundations for the potential eruption of widespread 
xenophobic and racial confrontations in Germany.   
3.4- 1981-1990: The Emergence of the Foreigner Problem  
 Largely as a result of the persistency of regressive ethnocultural sentiments, this 
stage in the development of German immigration and integration policy has been 
described by some analysts as a “lost decade.”29  Although the Kühn Memorandum, 
lenient family reunification policies and the reinforcement of the residency rights of the 
foreign population during the 1970s provided a solid foundation for integration efforts, 
this decade was largely characterized by policy retrenchment.  For the first time in the 
modern history of German immigration, immigration and integration issues began to be 
discussed under the rubric of a “foreigner problem.”30  This new discourse and the policy 
retrenchment that it produced stemmed primarily from the perceived threat posed by the 
influx into Germany of large numbers of recruited guestworkers during the initial phase 
of migration to post-War Germany.  With the composition of German society now more 
than ever beginning to bear the impact of this population movement, the native German 
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population increasingly came to view foreign resident communities as a source of societal 
instability.   
 After Kühn’s progressive integration policies were summarily rejected by 
government leadership, he resigned in frustration in 1979.  In the early 1980’s, his 
successor, Liselotte Funke, initiated a series of policies which represented a fundamental 
“change of tack in official policy, away from the short-lived emphasis on integration.”31  
These policies instead promoted a three-pronged approach that involved the exclusion of 
as many new arrivals as possible, the repatriation of the current foreign resident 
population with the paying of inducements, and, for those that refused to emigrate, the 
integration, or in this context, the coerced conversion to dominant German culture of the 
remaining foreign resident population.32  Not only did these policy proposals explicitly 
aim to induce the emigration of the current foreign resident population and further limit 
the number of migrants entering Germany, but they also established limits to this 
population’s internal mobility by restricting “the entrance of foreign workers into certain 
cities.”33  Continuing in this vein, the Turkish and Yugoslav decisions of 1987 furthered 
this widespread policy retrenchment by reaffirming absolute state discretion in 
determining the residency status of the foreign resident community.34     As opposed to 
Kühn’s encouragement of Islam in schools or his promotion of a wider franchise, official 
foreigner policies during this era aimed at producing a homogenously “German” society 
by instituting measures based on ethnocultural conceptions of German nationhood. 
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 The shift in the official policy stance of the German government regarding issues 
of immigration and integration during this stage stemmed precisely from the anti-
foreigner sentiments that inevitably accompany ethnocultural ideology.  Although 
Germany, with its tradition of ethnoculturalism, never exhibited a particularly favorable 
view of its foreign population, immigrants during this decade began to be overtly 
considered a source of societal instability.  This perception of foreigners derived 
primarily from the “belief that social peace [in Germany] would be destroyed by” the 
inevitable clashes produced by the emergence of an immigrant reality in an ethnocultural 
context.35  Although the official termination of recruitment programs in 1973 ostensibly 
ended large-scale immigration to Germany, the combination of jus sanguinis standards of 
citizenship and ineffective assimilation efforts in the 1970s resulted in the emergence of a 
rapidly growing and systematically marginalized foreign resident community.  This 
population, by fundamentally challenging the ethnocultural homogeneity that had 
traditionally characterized German society, represented a profoundly destabilizing force.   
The progressive policy recommendations of the Kühn Memorandum of 1979 had 
developed directly from the recognition of Germany’s de facto immigration status.  In 
contrast, the understanding of immigration and integration issues as a foreigner problem 
and the resulting development of regressive policies in the 1980s emerged directly from 
the continued assertion of Germany’s non-immigration status. 36  As an attempt to justify 
exclusivist measures, policymakers throughout the decade thus continually referenced 
Germany’s traditional (although not exactly historical) immigration status.  On 
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November 11, 1981, for instance, the German government issued a press release 
affirming that “Germany does not want to become an immigration country and will not 
do so.”37  A year later the federal government again declared that “the Federal 
Republic…is not a country of immigration and that it should not become one.”38  These 
assertions established the foundations for the construction of immigration and integration 
issues in Germany as a foreigner problem and, in turn, provided the basic impetus for the 
retrenchment of foreigner policies during this timeframe.   
As the decade progressed, however, it became increasingly difficult to maintain 
this fiction.  The Act to Promote the Preparedness of Foreign Workers to Return (1983), 
which aimed to realign the demographic reality in Germany with the country’s traditional 
ethnocultural ideology, represented the principal crystallization of immigration and 
integration policy during this period.39  The statute explicitly aimed to eliminate, or at 
least substantially reduce, the large population of foreign residents living in Germany by 
attaching significant monetary incentives (around DM 10,000 per individual) to 
emigration.  Ultimately, however, only 300,000 foreigners, an insignificant fraction of the 
population, accepted this offer.40  The statute’s failure both reaffirmed the long-term 
intentions of the foreign resident population and accentuated the German government’s 
inability to coerce emigration after the Arab and Indian decisions of the mid-1970s.  
More importantly, the inability of the German government to facilitate the emigration of 
this population implicitly established Germany as a country of immigration.  Largely as a 
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result of this unavoidable reality, “the perception grew [among policymakers] of the 
moral obligation which Germany owed its guestworkers and their families.”41  Despite 
the new-found concern for the foreign resident population, however, the persistent 
incompatibility between the contemporary state of affairs and traditional ethnocultural 
conceptions of Germany nationhood forestalled any significant integration.  By relying 
on the recently established “Foreigners Offices of the Länder to implement 
administrative regulations,” the federal government addressed these moral obligations 
indirectly.42  This decentralization of immigration and integration policies thus allowed 
the federal government to address its responsibilities to the foreign resident population 
while simultaneously avoiding the practical political problems that the enactment of such 
policies inevitably creates in a political climate characterized by ethnocultural ideology. 
The construction of the discourse on issues related to the guestworker community 
as a foreigner problem definitively characterized the development of immigration and 
integration policy during this period.  In the context of the German nation’s historical 
ethnocultural identification, the presence of a large foreign population threatened the 
stability of the German nation-state.  This population was thus identified as a potent 
source of social volatility.  The so-called foreigner problem, in turn, shaped the character 
of official immigration and integration policies during this stage of German policy 
development.  As the shifting demographic reality during this decade made it 
increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction of Germany’s non-immigration status, 
however, the exclusivist foreigner policies that emerged from this discourse were 
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fundamentally challenged.  Despite the unavoidable need for more realistic policy 
measures, a basic incompatibility characterized the relationship between emergent 
immigration and integration policies and traditional understandings of the German 
nation-state.  This period, although implicitly establishing Germany as an immigration 
country, therefore failed to produce the policies required for the country’s successful 
transition into its new role. 
3.5- 1990-1998: An Upsurge in Xenophobic Violence 
 Largely as a result of this new-found moral obligation, the beginning of the 1990s 
witnessed the passage of the new Foreigners Law on January 1, 1991.43  Although the 
statute did signify an important development in German immigration policy, it ultimately 
represented an ambiguous and, consequentially, ineffective policy.  The failure of this 
statute compelled many policymakers, such as Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, the new 
Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, to continue to demand more comprehensive 
integration measures.  These calls for reform were reinforced by several incidents in the 
early 1990s that accentuated the need for effective immigration and integration policies.  
At the beginning of the decade, the formal disintegration of the Soviet Union combined 
with the emergence of a violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia to produce an 
unprecedented influx of refugees to Germany.   In addition, the destabilizations produced 
by German reunification resulted in a surge of xenophobic violence across the country.  
This combination of political events thus highlighted the need for comprehensive and 
effective foreigner policies in the country.  However, while these events did reveal the 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
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necessity of such reforms, they ultimately forestalled the institution of progressive 
policies by transforming the foreigner issue from a practical concern into a political issue.  
 The 1990s in Germany began on a positive note in terms of immigration and 
integration policy with the passing of the Foreigners Law in 1990.  The statute reflected 
the emerging consensus among policymakers of the need for the “gradual adaptation” of 
the foreign population.44  By the end of the 1980s, 60 per cent of the foreign residents in 
the Federal Republic had been born there, making it increasingly difficult for the federal 
government to maintain the exclusivist policies that emerged from a traditional 
subscription to ethnocultural norms.45  The Foreigners Law attempted to address this 
situation by establishing a comprehensive and up-to-date immigration policy.  The statute 
expanded residence rights for those with unlimited residency permits, opened new 
opportunities for family reunification, liberalized the rules on naturalization, and 
generally “recogniz[ed] the permanent settlement of guestworkers.”46  Although the new 
Foreigners Law did represent a significant liberalization, it also retained several 
important restrictions.  The new statute, for instance, maintained the distinction between 
work and residency permits, which effectively allowed the federal government to prevent 
foreigners entitled to work from permanent residence and foreigners entitled to residence 
from legally working.47  As Barbara Marshall asserts, this ambivalence ultimately derived 
from the fact that the Foreigners Law “still maintained the fundamental distinction 
between Germans and foreigners…and continued to refer to the recruitment of 
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guestworkers as a unique event in the past which must not be repeated.”48  By refusing to 
accept Germany’s de facto immigration status and continuing to differentiate natives 
from foreigners, the new statute maintained two of the central assumptions of 
ethnocultural ideology.  As a result, the new Foreigners Law, with this dependence on 
ethnocultural assumptions, thus ultimately failed to establish an effective means of 
managing the foreign resident population. 
 Exacerbating the shortcomings of the Foreigners Law, developments on the 
international political scene in the early 1990s reinforced the need for a thorough and 
progressive German immigration policy.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union, combined 
with the war in Yugoslavia, led to an unprecedented influx of refugees into Germany 
(440,000 in 1992).49  At the same time, reunification with East Germany, which was 
characterized by widespread economic stagnation and social isolation, created fertile 
grounds for racism and xenophobia.  These events thus produced criticisms of German 
asylum policy and an explosion of anti-foreigner violence.  According to the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution, “2,351 violent incidents of racism took 
place in 1991” alone.50  One of the more notorious incidents, the Rostock riots of 1992, 
resulted in more than 1,000 extremists attacking homes for refugees and asylum 
seekers.51  Similar attacks occurred in Saxon Hoyerswerda in September of 1992, in 
Mölln in November of 1992, and in Sollingen in May of 1993.52  In response to both 
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these public demonstrations of disapproval and the undeniably large flow of refugees into 
the country, the German government amended the asylum law on June 1, 1993 by 
restrictively redefining refugee status.  “These modifications caused a considerable 
decrease in the number of people who applied to be refugees in Germany” and thus 
helped to appease the anti-foreigner sentiment rampant amongst portions of the German 
population.53  While this period began with the emergence of a promising new Foreigners 
Law, the unwillingness of the federal government to recognize its immigration status and 
the development of destabilizing international political events ultimately prohibited the 
establishment of an effective and comprehensive foreigner policy.   
 Despite this positive start to the decade, a combination of political unwillingness 
and unfortunate international events doomed the development of immigration and 
integration policy during this timeframe.  Although the reformed statute did tacitly accept 
the permanent residency status of much of Germany’s foreign population, it also 
maintained several important restrictions.  These restrictions derived from the fictitious 
understanding of Germany as a non-immigration country.  Despite such popular 
sentiments, certain policymakers, such as Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, continued to push 
for the rescission of the jus sanguinis citizenship model and the institution of various 
policy reforms.  With the contemporary political climate characterized by the 
politicization of foreigner issues, however, the policy establishment proved unwilling to 
take such a paradigmatic step.54   
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3.6- Post-1998: The New Nationality Act 
The most recent phase of immigration and integration policy development in 
Germany has produced a paradigmatic shift in foreigner policy.  The end of the sixteen-
year Kohl government in 1998 and the ascension of the new Social Democrats/Greens 
coalition created “new political openings” for policy reform in Germany.55  Marielouise 
Beck, the new commissioner of foreigner affairs and a member of the Greens, had, along 
with her fellow party-members, consistently reiterated the need for comprehensive 
immigration and integration policies.56  The new ruling coalition, due largely to the 
influence the Greens, thus enacted the new Nationality Act on January 1, 2000.  First and 
foremost, the new statute, by recognizing that “Germany is undergoing an irreversible 
process of immigration,” addressed the fundamental deficit in traditional German 
foreigner policy.57  Largely as a result of this explicit recognition, the Nationality Act 
implemented an attenuated jus soli principle that signified a fundamental break from the 
jus sanguinis model that had characterized German citizenship for nearly a century.  
Although the new Social Democrats/Greens coalition government intended to implement 
radical citizenship reform by instituting a pure jus soli model, the Christian Democratic 
opposition forced a compromise.  Claiming that such reform would create an 
unacceptable situation of dual loyalties, the opposition successfully lobbied for a 
“watered-down version” of the more radical reforms initially proposed by the ruling 
coalition.58  The result was the institution of an “option model” that allows children born 
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to non-German parents to hold a German passport and a passport of their parents’ 
nationality until the age of twenty-three.  At the age of majority, however, the individual 
must either decide to retain their German citizenship or their native citizenship.  While 
the Nationality Act undoubtedly represents a dramatic transformation of German 
immigration and integration policy, it still maintains an undeniable ethnocultural edge by 
demanding potential citizens to officially renounce any non-German identities. 
The legacy of ethnoculturalism, however, more plainly manifests itself in the 
maintenance of a culturalized conception of German citizenship in the Nationality Act.  
As intended, the statute’s liberalizations have increased the percentage of foreign 
residents capable of satisfying the explicit requirements of German citizenship.  Despite 
the progressiveness of the new statute, however, it has proven impossible to completely 
disconnect the Nationality Act from its ethnocultural heritage.  Indeed, the former Federal 
Minister of the Interior Otto Schilly implied in his introduction to the Nationality Act that 
naturalization inherently entails an accompanying process of cultural conversion 
(especially in the context of ethnocultural conceptions of citizenship).59  While 
superficially progressive, the Nationality Act in actuality reflects traditional ethnocultural 
norms by including an implicit cultural demand.  By hinging naturalization on the 
willingness of applicants to surrender their native identities in favor of an association 
with German culture, the Nationality Act still maintains a strong undercurrent of 
ethnocultural sentiment.   
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Information Office of the Federal Government, August 1999. 
 65 
The primary aim of the Nationality Act, according to its drafters, was to facilitate 
the formal incorporation (naturalization) of the foreign resident population by lowering 
barriers to citizenship.  By naturalizing a large portion of this population, policymakers 
believed that the Nationality Act would serve as a powerful tool of structural integration.  
Increased access to citizenship, however, does not in itself necessitate political 
integration.  Indeed, as scholars have noted, the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of national 
politics towards ethnic minorities is defined by both access to citizenship and the cultural 
obligation that such access obligates an individual.60  In culturally pluralistic societies, 
this second dimension, the cultural obligation attached to naturalization, represents a non-
factor as such systems permit a wide degree of cultural variation.  In contrast, however, 
assimilationist countries, such as Germany, “require a full conversion to the dominant 
culture as the single and unitary ideological focus of belonging and membership.”61  In 
the German context, the implicit cultural demands of the Nationality Act provide the 
practical means through which this conversion is both mandated and enforced.   
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Chapter 4: The Impact of the Nationality Act1  
4.1- Introduction 
 The Nationality Act which came into force on January 1, 2000, aimed to integrate 
Germany’s systematically marginalized foreign resident population by relaxing 
citizenship standards.  With an increased portion of this population eligible for 
naturalization under the liberalized standards of the statute, a cursory examination of the 
Nationality Act suggests that this policy has indeed succeeded.  Such a conclusion, 
however, represents an acontextual and superficial understanding of the Nationality Act.  
As noted in Chapter 2, a historical examination of the history of German citizenship, 
specifically in relation to immigration, necessitates an analysis of the Nationality Act 
within a post-Marshallian context.  This framework, as established in the previous 
chapter, transforms the ethnocultural conception of the nation-state, a definitive feature of 
German immigration and integration policy, from a unique and innocuous German 
tradition into a practical and effective mechanism of exclusion.  The ethnocultural legacy 
inherent in the Nationality Act thus prevents the establishment of a modern, state-based 
citizenship regime.  By continuing to demand that applicants satisfy the cultural 
obligations of citizenship necessitated by a traditional ethnocultural conception of the 
nation-state, the Nationality Act ultimately fails to escape from the long legacy of 
exclusivist foreigner policy in Germany.  This implied cultural demand fundamentally 
challenges the Nationality Act’s ability to facilitate the desired process of structural 
integration. 
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 Indeed, the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study revealed that, 
despite concrete policy liberalizations, nearly 80 per cent of the seemingly eligible 
foreign resident population still reported no intention to naturalize.  Despite the 
systematic exclusion of the immigrant population throughout German history, an 
overwhelming percentage of foreigners proved unwilling to accept naturalization as a 
means of inclusion.  This chapter attempts to address this puzzle by examining the impact 
of the Nationality Act on the three composite elements of structural integration.  By 
observing variations in numerous quantitative indicators of structural integration both 
before and after the enactment of the Nationality Act in 2000, this chapter allows for a 
determination of probable explanations for this incongruity.  Based on May’s 
conceptualization of structural integration, the next three sections examine representative 
indicators of “status and prestige, rights and power [and] access to material and 
immaterial goods,” respectively.2  Accordingly, section one begins by looking at various 
indicators of the status of the cultural integration of the foreign resident population.  
Section two then examines some quantitative measures of the degree of political 
integration of a representative sample of foreign residents.  Finally, section three 
considers a variety of indicators of economic integration.  Together, these three sections 
provide a comprehensive quantitative examination of the progress of structural 
integration both prior to and after the enactment of the Nationality Act on January 1, 
2000.  These data, in turn, provide this study with the ability to reconcile the increase in 
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access to naturalization with the decrease in the foreign resident population’s expressed 
intention to naturalize.   
Although the Nationality Act attempts to facilitate the integration of the foreign 
resident population by increasing access to naturalization, it, as the above-mentioned 
data-point suggests, by no means guarantees the success of this process.  The Nationality 
Act, while relaxing many key naturalization standards, still demands prospective 
applicants to satisfy a number of significant requirements.  These requirements, in turn, 
affect the availability of citizenship and subsequently impact the integration process.  
Without widespread eligibility among the foreign population, the Nationality Act can not 
facilitate the general process of structural integration that its proponents envisioned.  To 
fully understand the impact of the Nationality Act on the structural integration of the 
foreign resident population it is therefore necessary to consider this quantitative data 
within the institutional framework established by the statute.  
The complex requirements and demands of the Nationality Act thus provide a 
context for the examination of quantitative data in this chapter.  As of January 1, 2000, 
those individuals born in Germany to foreign parents with at least eight years of 
residency or in the at least the third year of an unlimited residence permit and those 
foreigners residing within the state for eight or more years and possessing a legal right to 
residence gained an entitlement to citizenship application.  Those individuals obtaining 
naturalization eligibility through length of residence must establish their commitment to 
the free democratic constitutional system of the German Republic, demonstrate an 
adequate knowledge of the German language, prove their unlimited right to residence 
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within the country, establish their ability to support themselves and their dependents 
without recourse to benefits, forfeit any previous citizenships, posses no criminal record 
and pay a significant application fee.3  For individuals born after the enactment of the 
Nationality Act in 2000 to foreign parents with at least eight years of residence or in the 
third year or later of an unlimited residence permit, German citizenship will be accorded 
automatically upon birth.  This partial jus soli element is complimented by an “option 
model,” which requires those acquiring citizenship through this channel to opt for either 
their native citizenship or their German citizenship once they reach the age of majority.   
In addition, the Nationality Act contains a transitional provision for children under ten 
years of age that entitled this population, up until December 31, 2000, to citizenship 
under the partial jus soli principle.  These various requirements and demands provide this 
chapter with a range of institutional constraints that act as the framework for the 
determination of structural integration.  
In addition to these explicit, logistical demands, a deeper understanding of the 
Nationality Act reveals an important implicit requirement.  As Otto Schilly, the former 
Federal Minster of the Interior, stated in the foreword to the statute, “The new framing of 
the German nationality law cannot bring about integration on command.”4  Since 
integration is a two-way street, he continued, naturalization demands certain minimum 
requirements.  Schilly’s association of naturalization with integration derives from 
Germany’s traditional ethnocultural approach to citizenship and, accordingly, imbues the 
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Nationality Act with an implicit cultural demand.  In the context of the history of German 
foreigner policies, the Nationality Act maintains traditional ethnocultural assumptions in 
the form of this cultural requirement.  
For the most part, Germany’s foreign resident population demonstrates both the 
requisite (explicit) eligibility and willingness demanded by the Nationality Act.  At the 
same time, however, the Nationality Act has largely failed to induce mass naturalizations.  
This incongruity suggests that shallow readings of both naturalization requirements and 
foreign resident eligibility fail to grasp the underlying cultural factor.  In this light, this 
chapter attempts to observe the impact of the Nationality Act on the propensity of the 
foreign population to naturalize and, in turn, integrate.  Since explicit naturalization 
requirements and willingness to formally integrate do not appear to be prohibitive 
obstacles, this section begins with an examination of the cultural orientation of the 
foreign resident population in the context of the implicit cultural demands of the statute.  
After determining the cultural eligibility of this population, this chapter continues with 
examinations of political and economic integration, specifically in relation to the 
Nationality Act’s implicit cultural requirements.  Together, the following analysis of 
empirical data examines the impact of the Nationality Act on the structural integration of 
the foreign resident population and attempts to explain this statute’s inability to affect 
widespread structural integration.   
4.2- Cultural Integration 
The substantial requirements associated with naturalization necessitate that any 
prospective applicant must conform to the specific stipulations established by Section 8 
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of the Nationality Act.  The application process thus requires such individuals to 
demonstrate a wide array of distinct attributes, including, for example, a minimum length 
of residence or financial self-sufficiency.  In addition to such explicitly defined 
qualifications, the Nationality Act also implicitly demands that the applicant demonstrate 
a willingness to assimilate into German society.  Although the only explicitly mentioned 
cultural requirement is German language proficiency (which itself can be viewed as a 
logistical requirement), Schilly’s foreword to the statute reveals the legacy 
ethnoculturalism that undergirds the Nationality Act.  In this institutional context, the 
cultural orientation of the foreign resident population can provide an indication of the 
eligibility of this population based on their connection with ethnic identities.  This section 
examines a range of cultural indicators, such as feelings of Germaness and identification 
with countries of origin, which objectively depict the cultural association of the foreign 
resident population and thus allow for a determination of the cultural eligibility of this 
population.  In addition, this section studies several other cultural indicators, such as 
social contact with native Germans and usual language spoken, to determine the impact 
of the enactment of the Nationality Act on the cultural orientation of this population.  
Accordingly, this section follows a two-pronged blueprint by observing indicators of both 
cultural eligibility and cultural convergence (although these indicators do largely 
overlap).  By observing the status of the foreign population relative to the status of the 
native population, this examination provides the foundations for an analysis of the impact 
of the Nationality Act on the cultural integration of the foreign resident population. 
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 An examination of the intention of a representative sample of seemingly-eligible 
foreign residents to naturalize isolates the implicit cultural element by assuring 
compliance with the explicit requirements contained in the Nationality Act.  This 
indicator also provides a straightforward indication of the willingness of this population 
to comply with the various demands and requirements enumerated in the Nationality Act.  
For those individuals reporting no intention to naturalize despite an ability to satisfy the 
explicit demands of the statute, the understood cultural conversion demanded by the 
statute most likely acts as a prohibitive obstacle to naturalization.  An examination of the 
data suggests a widespread reluctance among the eligible foreign resident population to 
apply for German citizenship both before and after the enactment of the Nationality Act 
in 2000.  In 1998 just under 25 per cent of the eligible foreign resident population 
reported that they would either “definitely” or “probably” apply for German citizenship 
with over 75 per cent responding that they would either “definitely not” or “probably not” 
seek citizenship.  Despite the Nationality Act’s elimination of many obstacles to 
acquiring citizenship, its passage in 2000 did not lead to any signifgant increase in the 
number of respondents replying affirmatively to this question.  Although for the year 
2000 just over 30 per cent of respondents did either “definitely” or “probably” plan on 
applying for citizenship, this number would fall back down to levels significantly lower 
than the 1998 level in subsequent years.  By 2004 only around 21 per cent of respondents 
reported some desire to apply for German citizenship while an astonishing 78 per cent 
stated that they did not intend to seek German citizenship (see Graph 4.1).  Despite the 
apparent eligibility of this population, an overwhelming segment asserted no intention to 
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naturalize.  To reconcile these facts it is important to look at both the potentially 
prohibitive aspects of application and the possibly unwanted effects of naturalization. 
From this perspective, the failure to meet the implicit cultural requirements of the 
Nationality Act and certain perceived disadvantageous ramifications of naturalization 
emerge as means of resolving this apparent incongruity.   
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 The most obvious reason behind this surprising disinclination lies in the 
potentially unwanted side-effects of naturalization, specifically the forfeiture of previous 
citizenships.  For those individuals meeting the requirements of the Nationality Act, even 
an undeveloped or wistful desire to emigrate can represent a prohibitive obstacle to 
naturalization. According to the Nationality Act, a foreign resident must be able to 
demonstrate eight years of consecutive residence to qualify for naturalization.   For those 
foreign residents intent on returning to their native countries, naturalization, with its 
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accompanying forfeiture of previous citizenships, simply represents an impractical 
option.  Historically, a significant proportion of the foreign resident population has 
harbored no desire to permanently reside within Germany.  In 1984 the percentage of 
foreign residents intending to return to their native countries peaked at over 71 per cent.  
This number, however, would steadily decline and would finally hover around 25 per 
cent during the post-2000 years (see Graph 4.2).  Despite this drastic decrease in 
respondents intending on returning home, this comparatively small portion still helps to 
explain the reluctance of at least a segment of the overwhelming majority of the eligible 
population that refuses to naturalize.  More importantly, however, the intention of this 
population to remain in Germany suggests that, in this context, the costs of naturalization, 
such as cultural demands, more so than the results of naturalization, such as citizenship 
forfeiture, act as significant impediments to naturalization.  As a result, the Nationality 
Act must prove capable of overcoming these costs if it hopes to facilitate a widespread 
process of structural integration.   
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Considering the permanency of most of this population’s intended residence and 
the ability of this population to meet explicit requirements, the fraction of individuals that 
actually desire to obtain German citizenship seems to suggest that a large segment of this 
population fails to satisfy the cultural requirements implicit in the Nationality Act.  
Indicators of the degree of connection felt by the foreign resident population towards the 
country of Germany reinforce this supposition.  The fifteen-year time period prior to the 
enactment of the Nationality Act in 2000 illustrates a high percentage of foreign resident 
respondents indicating little or no connection with Germany.  These reported sentiments 
elucidate the development of the cultural association of the foreign resident population.  
The percentage of this population that reported feeling “more foreign” or “all foreign” 
peaked in 1984 at well over 65 per cent.  As the years pass, however, this number 
gradually dwindles until bottoming out with just over 36 per cent reporting similar 
sentiments in 1999.  This trend suggests an increase in the number of foreign residents 
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identifying as German.  At the same time, however, the number of respondents reportedly 
feeling “neither German nor foreign” has remained at near record levels with almost 31 
per cent reporting such sentiments.  These data suggest that, while the number of foreign 
residents feeling more foreign than German has decreased to about a third of the 
population, the percentage feeling “neither German nor foreign” has steadily increased 
during this same timeframe (see Graph 4.3).  As a result, on the eve of the enactment of 
the Nationality Act in 2000, nearly 70 per cent of foreign resident respondents reported 
no cultural association with Germany.  Although the lack of such a cultural association 
does not necessarily prohibit naturalization in light of the implicit cultural demand of the 
Nationality Act, it does intimate that the vast majority of the foreign resident population, 
at the very least, lacks any cultural impetus to naturalize.   The expressed cultural 
association of this population suggests that cultural identity acts, in the best case, as a 
non-factor and, in the worst case, as a powerful force that compels the individual to avoid 
naturalization.   
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 Although the Nationality Act did ease naturalization standards, the statute still 
demands prospective applicants to display their compliance with several requirements.  
The proportion of the seemingly eligible foreign resident population that expressed no 
intention to pursue naturalization hints at the less obvious demands of the Nationality 
Act.  These demands arise at both ends of the naturalization process, specifically 
application and acceptance.  Acceptance of German citizenship after a process of 
naturalization forces the foreign resident to formally forfeit any previous citizenship and 
thus essentially bars any future emigration.  The permanency of the majority of this 
population, however, suggests that this factor, although important, is not the primary 
motivating dynamic behind the reluctance to naturalize.  Rather, an examination of the 
cultural association of this population reveals that a majority of foreign residents fail to 
meet the implicit cultural requirements of the Nationality Act.  Instead of identifying with 
Germany, this population exhibits cultural associations that, to a great extent, prohibit 
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naturalization.  The success of the Nationality Act at facilitating structural integration 
ultimately depends on the convergence of the cultural identifications of the native and 
foreign populations.  Not until these cultural associations converge upon some mutual 
ground will the native population relinquish its demand of cultural homogeneity and will 
the foreign resident population exhibit a willingness to become “German.”  
 The foreign resident population, rather than associating with Germany, often 
identifies with either their respective country of origin or with no state at all.  The visiting 
habits of this population to their native countries represent the first indicator of the lack 
of connection between the foreign population and their adopted homeland.  For the four 
years before and the four years after the institution of the Nationality Act in 2000 the vast 
majority of this population reported extended visits to their native countries during the 
previous two years while only around 10 per cent consistently reported not visiting.  
During this eight-year period, well over a majority of these visits, nearly 57 per cent, 
lasted longer than a month.  By 2004 only about 84 per cent reported visiting and of these 
visits just under 50 per cent were longer than a month.  While it is possible that the 
gradual decline in the frequency and duration of visits stems from the liberalization of 
naturalization requirements, this trend does not correlate with the enactment of the 
reforms and thus suggests independent causation.  Even with this downward trend, the 
data still suggest that the foreign resident population remains only incidentally connected 
with Germany (see Graph 4.4).  Frequent trips of extended duration not only suggest 
strong ties to native homelands, in the form of family, friends, property, etc., but they 
also intimate the possibility, even if a far-fetched and undeveloped one, of eventually 
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emigrating.  These data thus illustrate the often superficial connection between the 
foreign population and their adopted homeland.  In this context, the assimilation 
demanded by the Nationality Act represents both a forfeiture of dreams of return and a 
cultural surrender to German cultural hegemony.  As a result, despite the increased access 
to citizenship produced by the Nationality Act, prohibitive obstacles till exist that prevent 
this population from naturalizing and, in turn, integrating.   
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Indeed, an examination of the sentiments of this population during these visits 
supports the connection of such visits with the cultural association of the individual.  The 
reported sentiments of belonging during such visits thus serve as the second indicator of 
the cultural association of this population.   In 2004, nearly 80 per cent of this population 
reported feeling at home in their native countries within at least a few days after arriving, 
which was in line with the previous fourteen-year average of just over 79 per cent (see 
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Graph 4.5).  Over this same span, the proportion of individuals that reported “never” 
feeling at home in their country of origin rarely peaked over 10 per cent.  With only a 
small minority of individuals that engage in such visits reporting an inability to “feel at 
home,” the vast majority of this population necessarily exhibits some kind of association 
with their country of origin.  In order to naturalize, the foreign resident population must 
associate first and foremost with Germany.  The close associations with countries of 
origin that this population reported, however, suggest that connections to Germany are 
largely accidental and superficial.  In the face of the implicit cultural demands of the 
Nationality Act, these data assert that foreign residents will, for the most part, prove 
unwilling to make the cultural and identity-based sacrifices demanded by the 
assimilationist implications of the statute.  With a significant segment of the foreign 
resident population largely unwilling or unable to naturalize, the Nationality Act will 
unavoidably fail to facilitate the desired process of structural integration.  Only after a 
process of cultural integration and convergence will this population prove able to meet 
the implicit demands of the Nationality Act and will the Nationality Act therefore prove 
capable of expediting this process of structural integration.    
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 The cultural association of this population is also reflected in their domestic social 
interactions.  The social tendencies of the foreign resident population thus serve as the 
third indicator of their cultural association.  The tendency of this population to associate 
with non-German identities prior to any Germany identity reflects quite clearly in the 
social habits of many foreign residents.  Often identifying primarily with their ethnic 
identities, a significant portion of this population socializes almost exclusively with 
fellow foreign residents.  Although the majority of this population has lived in Germany 
for an extended number of years and expresses no intention to leave, an average of just 
under 22 per cent of this population reported not visiting a single German even once 
during the previous year.  Both before and after 2000, this figure remained quite stable; 
typically hovering in the lower half of the twentieth percentile (see Graph 4.6).  The 
constancy of these figures both before and after 2000 suggests that the Nationality Act 
has failed to induce the desired process of convergence.  Even with only a fifth of the 
population responding to the question negatively, the fact that even this small segment 
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could completely avoid social interactions with native Germans for an entire year testifies 
to the potency of a non-German cultural identity.  With such a significant proportion of 
this population interacting exclusively with similar individuals, the foreign resident 
population exhibits an undeniable isolation from mainstream society.  At the same time, 
however, the Nationality Act implicitly demands that these individuals identify with 
mainstream society in order to qualify for naturalization.  As a result, the cultural 
association of this population represents a prohibitive impediment to the satisfaction of 
the implicit cultural demands of the Nationality Act and thus ultimately inhibits the 
facilitation of structural integration.     
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Additionally, the linguistic behavior of the foreign resident population can 
provide an indication of the population’s cultural association.  As a result, the linguistic 
habits of this population, specifically the frequency of use of both German and foreign 
languages, serves as the fourth indicator of cultural association. This measure of 
frequency of use, as opposed to subjective self-estimates of proficiency, provides a good 
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indication of the cultural connection of the individual with their non-German identity.   
While between 1996 and 2005 an average of just over 40 per cent of foreign resident 
respondents reported speaking mostly German, close to a quarter of this population 
admitted to conversing exclusively in their native tongue (see Graph 4.7).  The large 
segment of the population that admitted to an exclusive usage of a foreign language, most 
likely, exhibits a significant association with a non-German identity.  Even for the 37 per 
cent that, on average, reported speaking both German and their native language equally, 
the dependence on this foreign language often derives from a strong identification with a 
non-German culture.  These figures remained stable both before and after the enactment 
of the Nationality Act in 2000 thus suggesting that the policy liberalizations produced no 
significant impact on the linguistic behaviors of the foreign resident population.  With 
well over half of the relevant population exhibiting strong linguistic ties to their native 
countries and with the Nationality Act affecting no noticeable change, a large segment of 
the foreign resident population undoubtedly lacks any significant cultural association 
with Germany.  As a result, a significant segment of this population inevitably fails to 
meet the cultural demands implicit in the Nationality Act and thus will prove unable to 
naturalize despite the liberalized demands of the statute.      
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Although indicators of a significant association with non-German identities do not 
by definition prevent naturalization, certain cultural aspects can entirely forestall this 
process.  For instance, German language ability, the fifth indicator of cultural association, 
represents a necessary component of naturalization.  The Nationality Act establishes the 
central role of the German language by mandating the ability to “conduct conversations 
commensurate with one’s age and education” as a requirement for naturalization 
applicants.5  Between 1997 and 2005, on average just under half of respondents reported 
either a “good” or “very good” grasp of spoken German.  This means that during this 
time span over half of the foreign resident population thought their German language 
skills were at best “fair” with nearly a third of the population during this time span 
reporting either “poor” or “non-existent” German language ability (see Graph 4.8).  The 
subjective self-estimated proficiency of the foreign resident population indicates that, for 
a large percentage of individuals, the language requirement could prove a prohibitive 
                                                
5 Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany, “The Modern Nationality Law,” section 2. 
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obstacle to naturalization.  In addition, an inability to speak German effectively prohibits 
a given individual from communicating and interacting with German society.  
Consequentially, poor German language ability among the foreign population guarantees 
this population’s exclusion from German society and, in turn, solidifies their association 
with non-German identities.  Language skills therefore prove essential to the convergence 
required to translate the Nationality Act from an impotent statute to a feasible avenue for 
structural integration.   
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 Although the Nationality does greatly relax naturalization standards in Germany, 
the statute still demands prospective applicants to meet certain requirements.  Perhaps 
most overlooked, the Nationality Act implicitly contains an assimilationist cultural 
obligation.  Accounting for the impact of this implicit requirement helps reconcile the 
surprising incongruity between the eligibility of foreign residents and the actual intention 
of this population to naturalize.  This section, after looking at several indicators of 
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cultural association, finds that a significant segment of the foreign resident population 
identifies strongly with non-German cultures.  In the institutional context established by 
the undergirding ethnocultural philosophy of the Nationality Act, prospective applicants 
must prove willing to assimilate into German cultural life.  This inevitably produces a 
stalemate between foreigners able to meet the explicit demands of the Nationality Act but 
intent on maintaining their cultural heritage and popular German sentiment that still, to a 
great extent, connects citizenship with cultural identity.  While the majority of the foreign 
resident population’s hesitancy to naturalize derives from this cultural divide, this section 
also finds that, in a more practical way, poor language ability among this population can 
represent a significant obstacle to naturalization.  It appears that the enactment of the 
Nationality act has done little to address either of these possible sources of ineligibility.  
If the Nationality Act is to produce integration through eased naturalization standards, it 
first has to recognize the incongruity between the cultural expectations of the statute and 
the cultural reality of the foreign population.  Although the Nationality Act attempts to 
address integration through political means, it is ultimately the cultural associations of the 
native and foreign populations that will determine the success of this policy.  Without the 
convergence of cultural identities, naturalization and, as a result, integration will not 
represent a viable option for this population. With the Nationality Act no longer 
producing large naturalization rates and with its enactment failing to facilitate any 
convergence between the cultural positions of natives and foreigners, these liberalizations 
have ultimately failed to produce the intended end-result, specifically widespread 
structural integration 
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4.3- Political Integration 
 Although cultural identification primarily affects the integration process prior to 
any decision to naturalize, the political behavior of the foreign resident population mostly 
affects integration after naturalization.  Except for the motivational desire for political 
inclusion, almost no implicit or explicit political requirements are contained in the 
Nationality Act (Section 8 does prohibit naturalization for those committed to subverting 
the democratic political system, but this condition affects a negligible portion of the 
population).  The Nationality Act therefore interacts with political integration, in the 
sense of formal political rights and power, primarily after an individual naturalizes.  By 
facilitating formal incorporation into the polity, the Nationality Act aims to increase the 
political participation and interest of the foreign resident population.  This section thus 
examines variations in several indicators of interest in political inclusion, such as actual 
interest in German politics and participation in political initiatives, for example. By 
observing these indicators, this section aims to determine whether the enactment of the 
Nationality Act on January 1, 2000 has induced a process of political integration among 
the foreign population.  In addition to observing indicators of political integration both 
before and after the enactment of the Nationality Act, indicators of the current nature of 
the political engagement of the foreign population are observed as a means of 
determining this population’s propensity to become politically active in the future.  Since 
active political engagement does not necessarily stem from increased access to 
citizenship, these measures of the inclination towards active involvement allow for a 
more accurate determination of the Nationality Act’s impact on political integration.  
 88 
While basic political integration is the primary goal of the statute, active involvement 
proves necessary if the Nationality Act is expected to induce a wider process of structural 
integration. 
The intended process of political integration assumes the existence or 
development of a general interest in domestic German politics after naturalization.  The 
first indicator of the progress of political integration is thus the interest of this population 
in German politics.  During the eleven year span between 1995 and 2005, only 7.5 per 
cent of those individuals initially identifying in the survey as foreign reported a “very 
strong” interest in domestic politics (see Graph 4.9).  Despite this alarmingly low interest 
in politics, there does appear to be a slight increase in political interest after the passage 
of the Nationality Act in 2000.  Prior to its passage, barely 28 per cent of this population 
reported either a “very strong” or “strong” interest in German politics; however, after 
2000, an average of about 37 per cent reported similar sentiments.  With those individuals 
that eventually obtain citizenship still represented in the survey’s foreigner sample, this 
growth in interest most likely derives from the surge in naturalizations that initially 
followed the enactment of the Nationality Act in 2000.  This increase indicates that the 
greater availability of citizenship produced by the Nationality Act did indeed generate a 
limited increase in political interest among the target population.  Compared to the native 
German population’s reported interest in politics (around 68 per cent in 2004), which 
represented the highest such figure in all Europe, however, the percentage of foreign 
residents expressing an interest in politics still appears relatively low.  Despite this 
marked disparity within Germany, these foreign resident political interest figures are 
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higher than native interest figures in many countries, including Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Spain and Finland to name just a few.6   Although the foreign 
resident population exhibits a substantial interest in politics, the decelerating nature of 
this increase coincides with the stabilization of naturalization rates that occurred after the 
initial post-2000 explosion. This establishes a firm connection between naturalization and 
political interest.  As a result, although the passage of the Nationality Act in 2000 has 
increased interest in politics, the reticent approach of this population toward 
naturalization ensures that such increases will remain both gradual and modest without a 
resurgence of foreign resident naturalization rates.  Unsurprisingly, the Nationality Act 
can only facilitate political integration if the target population first demonstrates 
willingness and eligibility.  As these data illustrate, the ability of the Nationality Act to 
produce political integration is circumscribed by the foreign resident population’s 
inability to comply with both the implicit and explicit demands of the statute.         
                                                
6 Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, “Internationale Sozialwissenschaftliche Umfrage 2004: 
Bürger und Staat,” http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy 
/ZA3950, (accessed February 28, 2007). 
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 Although political interest provides a necessary foundation for the process of 
political integration, this process also demands the more active involvement of the 
foreign resident population.  Active involvement, in many ways, requires an individual to 
possess citizenship, as, without the rights and duties that accompany citizenship, a 
foreign individual will largely lack the political capital needed to become a significant 
political actor.  An observation of the actual political participation of the foreign resident 
population can thus help to determine whether increased access to citizenship has indeed 
produced greater political integration  The variations in the actual involvement of this 
population in political activities therefore provides the second indicator of political 
integration.  Although the foreign resident respondents reporting either a “very strong” or 
“strong” interest in politics reached over 40 per cent in 2003, those actually reporting an 
involvement with some form of political initiative or activity was drastically lower.  
Indeed, from 1995 to 2005 around 90 per cent of this population admitted to having 
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absolutely no involvement in any sort of domestic political activity (although many 
scholars recognize the propensity of the foreign resident population to participate in 
political movements oriented toward homeland issues, only domestic political 
participation proves relevant in an observation of integration efforts).7  Unlike the 
expressed interest of this population in German politics, this number fluctuated only three 
percentage points over this ten-year span (see Graph 4.10).  While increased access to 
citizenship may contribute to a more acute interest in domestic politics, participation in 
domestic political initiatives proved unaffected by the relaxation of citizenship standards.  
This differentiation between the Nationality Act’s impact on passive and active indicators 
of political integration can, however, be explained, at least partially, by the typically 
delayed appearance of indicators of active participation.  Although naturalization can 
spur a more immediate interest in politics, its promotion of actual participation is more 
deferred and unpredictable.  While the increased access to citizenship has resulted in 
more interest in politics, it has not, and does not necessarily, have to produce an increase 
in active participation.  Although the Nationality Act has positively affected the passive 
political disposition of the foreign resident population, it has done little, so far, to actually 
foster the active political incorporation of this population.  Even though the absence of 
any relationship between the Nationality Act and participation in political initiatives does 
not mean the failure of the statute to facilitate political integration, it does indicate that, to 
this point, any political integration that has been generated has been primarily shallow 
                                                
7 Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, “Political Claims-Making against Racism and Discrimination in 
Britain and Germany,” in Comparative Perspectives on Racism, ed. Jessika ter Wal and Maykel Verkuyten 
(London: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 153. 
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and passive.  Essentially, the divergence between expressed interest and actual 
participation in politics suggests that the increased access to citizenship produced by the 
Nationality Act has, to a great extent, failed to more substantively integrate the foreign 
population into German political life. 
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While the foreign resident population exhibited little involvement in any political 
initiatives, involvement in local civic organizations can prove both more feasible and 
effective.  Such organizations do not require citizenship, typically appeal to the particular 
interests of the population, have more local roots and, in many ways, resemble higher 
political organizations.  Civic organizations can therefore provide a useful indicator of 
the tendency of the foreign resident population to become more substantively engaged in 
political activities after naturalization.  The relative representation of foreigners in civic 
organizations and the nature of these organizations thus provide the third indicator of 
political integration. Unsurprisingly, in 2002 the rate of membership in civic associations 
(including trade union, party, sport association or citizen committee) among the foreign 
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resident population, at around 31 per cent, was significantly lower than the rate of 
membership among the native German population at just over 50 per cent.8  The 
significant differential between native and foreign membership appeared stable both 
before and after the enactment of the Nationality Act in 2000.  The Nationality Act then 
has not noticeably affected the representation of the foreign resident population in these 
organizations, which is not altogether surprising considering the openness of these 
organizations to citizens and foreigners alike.  Since active civic participation “is related 
to higher political and civic engagement,” the substantial interest of this population in 
civic organizations could translate into greater involvement in political initiatives. 9   The 
forms these memberships assume, however, allow for a deeper understanding of the 
propensity of newly-naturalized foreigners to actively pursue politics. The general types 
of membership that foreign residents hold reveal that the majority of reported 
memberships are career-related.  Indeed, the largest portion of foreign resident 
memberships consistently derives from participation in trade unions with over a third of 
memberships deriving from this source (see Graph 4.11).  The second and third largest 
forms of foreign resident membership also stem from the workplace, with professional 
associations and employees councils representing the next two largest contributors.  The 
final category of foreign resident memberships is not work related, but with fewer than 
five per cent consistently reporting membership in some form of interest group, this 
segment of the population proves largely negligible.  The prevalence of work-related 
                                                
8 Cyrus, Norbert, “Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany,” Country Report Prepared for the 
European Research Project POLITIS (Oldenburg, 2005): 26. 
9 Cyrus, “Active Civic Participation,” 31. 
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memberships again reflects the passive nature of the civic involvement of the majority of 
this population, as foreign resident membership in trade unions and other work-related 
organizations typically signifies little active involvement. 10   As a result, the 
representation of foreigners in primarily passive civic organizations suggests that simply 
easing citizenship standards will prove incapable of overcoming the political 
marginalization of this community.  The Nationality Act, while promoting a shallow 
political integration, fails to address the roots of exclusion and thus ultimately proves 
incapable of fostering a more general process of integration.         
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 Although the type of organization can help to surmise the involvement of a given 
individual, studies of the actual active participation rate of the foreign resident population 
provide a more accurate indication of their involvement in civic organizations.  This 
                                                
10Ibid., 27. 
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measure of active involvement thus represents the fourth indicator of political integration. 
According to a general survey, about 29 per cent of Germans are voluntarily active in 
civic organizations, compared to only 12-19 per cent of resident foreigners.11  These data 
thus verify the low active participation rates of the foreign resident population.  These 
low membership rates and even lower active participation rates make it unlikely that the 
shallow political integration facilitated by the Nationality Act will eventually translate 
into more substantive political involvement.   The Nationality Act will likely fail to 
facilitate the political integration of the foreign resident population in Germany, as the 
statute induces only superficial integration into German political life. 
 The actual voting patterns of the foreign resident population provide the most 
direct evidence of the political behavior of this population.  Since complete political 
integration entails the active participation of the foreign resident population in the 
German political process, their voting patterns provide a good indication of political 
integration.  An examination of the voting behavior of the foreign resident population 
thus provides the fifth and final indicator of the degree of political integration of this 
population.  Unsurprisingly, native Germans expressed an intention to vote more often 
than citizens with immigrant origins.  A representative Berlin survey revealed that an 
overwhelming 87 per cent of native Germans expressed an intention to vote, while, 
unexpectedly, the Turkish population, at an 83 per cent pace, represented the second 
most-likely ethnic group to go to the polls.12  Despite the Turks’ surprising propensity to 
vote, other ethnic groups reported much less enthusiasm for voting.  Indeed, only 63 per 
                                                
11 Ibid., 31. 
12 Ibid. 
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cent of ethnic Russians reported any intention to vote.   Although this suggests a wide 
range of voting behavior among ethnically non-German citizens, in every case the 
propensity to vote was higher for the native German population.  Despite the discrepancy 
between ethnic German and ethnically non-German voting rates, these figures still 
attribute a relatively high intention to vote to the ethnically non-German population.  
While the tendency of ethnically non-German citizens to vote is, in all cases, lower than 
the tendency of ethnic Germans, the figures suggest that, given the chance, a significant 
segment of the foreign resident population expresses an intention to vote.   These data 
appear unsurprising in light of the significant interest expressed by the foreign population 
in politics and thus help to verify this population’s reported interest in German political 
life.  Despite their incidental contact with German politics through civic organizations 
and voting, however, the foreign resident population has exhibited an inability to become 
more actively engaged in German politics.  The increased access to citizenship produced 
by the Nationality Act has promoted shallow political integration while neglecting 
substantive involvement.   The Nationality Act undoubtedly increases opportunities for 
naturalization, but has, to date, done little to affect the marginalization and isolation that 
prevents this population from becoming more influential political actors.  As a result, the 
Nationality Act, which aims to facilitate political integration, has ultimately failed to 
achieve its goal.  Without deep political integration, the statute proves largely incapable 
of affecting any wider process of structural integration as it ensures the native population 
a greater degree of political leverage.      
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 The Nationality Act, if successful, should produce the most visible and immediate 
impacts in the political realm.  By increasing the naturalization rate of the foreign 
resident population, the new citizenship policies should facilitate a process of political 
integration.  Basic measures of the interest of the ethnically non-German population in 
politics do indeed suggest that this population harbors the requisite interest in German 
politics.  Additionally, observations of the nature of the current political engagement of 
this population, such as degree and form of civic involvement, depict foreign 
involvement as largely passive.  Although the lack of active political participation may 
reflect the freshness of the reforms, it more likely derives from the passivity that has 
traditionally typified foreign involvement.  Either way, the superficial political 
integration of this population suggests that the Nationality Act has, to date, failed to 
facilitate any substantive process of political integration.  A significant proportion of this 
population expresses an intention to vote, which reflects both the interest reported by this 
population in politics and the limited political integration produced by the Nationality 
Act.  This limited or superficial political integration, however, ensures that the native 
German population will continue to possess a greater degree of political leverage than the 
foreign resident population.  As a result, the Nationality Act has failed to produce 
political integration, as a convergence between the political rights and powers of the 
native and foreign populations proves impossible under these conditions.  Without 
political integration, the Nationality Act, which is based upon this process, will inevitably 
fail to facilitate any wider process of structural integration.   
4.4- Economic Integration 
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 Although the Nationality Act primarily aims to promote the cultural and political 
integration of the foreign resident population, the integration process can not be 
completed without a degree of economic parity between the native and foreign 
populations.  Not only is economic position an indicator of integration, but it also serves 
as a determinant of naturalization.  The Nationality Act mandates that a prospective 
applicant must be “able to ensure his or her own subsistence and the subsistence of his or 
her dependants without recourse to benefits.13  A large economic divide between the 
native and foreign population thus inhibits integration from both sides by preventing 
naturalization and creating economic disparity.  In theory, the cultural and political 
integration produced by the Nationality Act should result in greater economic parity by 
more closely connecting the foreign resident population with mainstream German 
society.  This section thus examines key indicators of economic position, such as 
unemployment rates and dependence on government transfers, both before and after the 
enactment of the Nationality Act on January 1, 2000.  In addition, other indicators, such 
as foreign resident enrollment in vocational or training opportunities, allow for a 
determination of subtle signs of economic mobility among this population.  Indicators in 
this chapter thus provide for an examination of both the impact of the Nationality Act on 
various economic measures over a number of years and the statute’s ability to actually 
facilitate economic convergence.  This section therefore allows for a determination of 
whether the Nationality Act has, so far, encouraged economic integration, defined here as 
                                                
13 Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany, “The Modern Nationality Law,” Section 9. 
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access to material and immaterial goods, and if, based on observable variables, the act 
will facilitate such a process in the near-future.   
 The most fundamental indicator of the economic position of a population is a 
measure of that particular population’s rate of unemployment.  Without access to 
employment, the individual lacks any access to the material goods that define their 
relative economic position in society.  In addition, the inability of a prospective applicant 
to demonstrate employment will most likely prevent them from satisfying the economic 
demands of naturalization.  The unemployment rate of this population thus serves as the 
first indicator of economic integration.  At the end of 2004, 4.3 million people were 
registered as unemployed in Germany and, of these individuals, .53 million were foreign 
residents.14  This meant that while 12 per cent of the German population was 
unemployed, around 20 per cent of the resident foreigner population reported such 
misfortune.  An examination of the period from 1995-2005 reveals that these numbers are 
well within each segments average unemployment rate (see Graph 4.12)15.  Indeed, the 
average rate of unemployment for the years prior to 2000, at just under 20 per cent, is 
nearly identical to the post-2000 rate.  During this period, the rate of unemployment for 
the foreign resident population is consistently double the rate of unemployment for the 
German citizen population and does not seem to react at all to the enactment of the 
Nationality Act in 2000.  Based on these unemployment figures, the foreign resident 
population is characterized by a comparatively weak economic position that not only 
                                                
14 Cyrus, “Active Civic Participation,” 14. 
15 Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung, http://www.emz-berlin.de/Statistik_2/de/de_03.htm 
(accessed January 27, 2007). 
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prevents integration generally but can also entirely forestall the naturalization process.  
Without more equal access to material and immaterial goods, the foreign resident 
population will inevitably possess fewer resources than their native counterparts, which, 
in turn, prevents them from acting alongside one another in German society.  
Consequentially, these figures suggest that the Nationality Act has failed to produce any 
noticeable economic integration, which, in turn, ensures the maintenance of the native 
population’s relatively stronger economic position. 
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 The relatively weak economic position of the foreign resident population is 
reflected in the disproportionate dependence of this population on various forms of 
government transfers.  Like unemployment, dependence on such social assistance can 
both disqualify an individual for naturalization and, more generally, prevent a 
convergence of the economic positions of the native and foreign populations.  As a result, 
an examination of the rate of dependence of the foreign resident population on social 
assistance serves as the second indicator of economic integration.  At the end of 2003, 
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617,000 foreign nationals received some form of social assistance.16  This meant that 8.4 
per cent of this population was receiving social assistance, compared to only 2.9 per cent 
of the German citizen population.  Over the years, the amount of foreign residents on the 
German welfare roles has consistently exceeded their population share and continues to 
grow.17  The sizeable presence of foreign nationals in the German welfare system, 
combined with the disproportionate occurrence of unemployment among this population, 
has left the foreign resident population in a considerably weaker economic position than 
German citizens.  This weaker economic position, in turn, has both prevented individuals 
from applying for naturalization and also contributed to the isolation of this population 
from mainstream German society.  As these figures suggest, the Nationality Act has, to 
date, proved incapable of affecting any economic integration, as the post-2000 years 
show little improvement in the relative economic position of the foreign resident 
population.     
 The foundation of this economic inequality lies in the foreign resident 
population’s infrequent access to various training opportunities, including schooling and 
vocational instruction.  A comparison of the composition of the student bodies of various 
types of schools provides the opportunity to observe any shifts in the educational 
opportunities accessed by the foreign resident population.  An examination of the 
enrollment of this population in various training opportunities therefore serves as the 
third indicator of economic integration.  Although variations in the composition of the 
                                                
16 Cyrus, “Active Civic Participation,” 14. 
17 Regina T. Riphahn, “Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence from German 
Guestworkers,” Institute for the Study of Labor (December 21, 2004): 1. 
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student bodies of various compulsory schools, such as primary schools and grammar 
schools, does not allow for substantive inferences, the composition of various optional 
programs, such as evening schools and adult education programs, can prove very 
enlightening.  The data reveal that for almost every optional form of general education, 
the share of foreign resident participation has decreased (see Chart 4.1).   Although the 
decrease in foreign resident pupils in these optional schools never reached over 5 per 
cent, the very fact that their presence in these schools is decreasing suggests that their 
economic position will remain, at best, static.  Meanwhile, an examination of the same 
data for the German citizens reveals the opposite trend.  Indeed, German citizen 
enrollment in every optional school increased over this time period (see Chart 4.2).  
These optional schools, representing mainly evening schools and adult education 
programs, are important because they provide the individual with the opportunity to 
improve their economic position by increasing their level of education.  The decrease in 
foreign resident involvement in these programs, combined with the increase in German 
citizenship participation, only reinforces the economic divide between these two 
populations.  The persistence of such a stark divide between the economic positions of 
the two populations not only guarantees the ineligibility of a significant segment of the 
foreign resident population for naturalization, but it also perpetuates this population’s 
isolation from mainstream society.  As a result, these trends suggest that the Nationality 
Act has had no positive impact on the economic integration of the foreign resident 
population and, based on these data, that no such process will occur in the near-future.  
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Schools of General Education- Foreign Pupils by Types of Schools (4.1)18 
School Year   
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06   
Type of School Unit 
Absolute 
Per 
Cent 
Change 
Pre-Schools 1000 4.6 4.3 1.3 -70.7 
School Kindergartens 1000 8.2 7 4.5 -35.1 
Primary Schools 1000 369.4 361.4 354.3 -2 
General Secondary schools 1000 203.1 203.1 193.6 -4.7 
Intermediate Schools 1000 91.1 97.9 99.1 1.2 
Grammar Schools 1000 92.8 98.4 101.7 3.3 
Evening Secondary Schools 1000 0.5 0.5 0.5 -5.4 
Evening Intermediate Schools 1000 5.3 5.5 5.2 -4.3 
Evening Grammar Schools 1000 2.8 2.8 2.8 -0.1 
Adult Education Colleges 1000 1 1 1 0.8 
All School Types 1000 962.8 951.3 929.5 -2.3 
 
Schools of General Education-  Pupils by Types of Schools (4.2)19 
School Year   
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06   Type of School Unit 
Absolute Per Cent 
Pre-Schools 1000 19.3 18.6 8.2 -55.8 
School Kindergartens 1000 34.6 29.4 21.8 -25.8 
Primary Schools 1000 3146.9 3149.5 3176.5 0.9 
General Secondary schools 1000 1092.5 1084.3 1023.8 -5.6 
Intermediate Schools 1000 1296.7 1351.5 1324.7 -2 
Grammar Schools 1000 2316.3 2404 2431.3 1.1 
Evening Secondary Schools 1000 1.3 1.3 1.4 4.4 
Evening Intermediate Schools 1000 19.2 20.8 21.7 4.4 
Evening Grammar Schools 1000 19.6 20.5 21.1 3.1 
Adult Education Colleges 1000 16.6 17.7 18.3 3.7 
All School Types 1000 9727 9624.9 9505.2 -1.2 
  
 Similarly, vocational training can provide individuals with the opportunity to 
strengthen their economic position by acquiring various skills.  An examination of the 
                                                
18 Federal Statistical Office of Germany http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/biwiku/schultab9.htm, January 27, 
2007. 
19 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/biwiku/schultab5.htm, January 27, 
2007. 
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enrollment figures of the foreign resident population in such vocational opportunities thus 
acts as the fourth indicator of economic integration.  An increase in the enrollment of 
foreign resident pupils in the years after 2000 would indicate that this population is 
beginning to obtain the means to increase their economic position.  Again, however, the 
numbers seem to suggest a decrease in foreign resident participation in such programs.  A 
closer examination of the data reveals that the overall decrease in the participation rate of 
the foreign resident population results from sharp declines in enrollment in certain 
schools and only moderate increases in others (see Chart 4.3).  Indeed, many of the 
various vocational schools saw increases in the number of enrolled foreign residents.  
However, the sharp declines in participation in higher-status vocational programs, such as 
trade and technical schools and specialized academics, more than compensated for the 
moderate increases in other areas.  Meanwhile, the amount of German pupils in these 
vocational programs increased slightly over this same timeframe.  While both populations 
witnessed negative changes in enrollment for the same vocational institutions, the 
decrease in the amount of foreign resident pupils was significantly higher than the 
decrease in the amount of German citizens in every instance (see Chart 4.4).  Although 
German citizen representation in the higher-status vocational programs declined, the rate 
of change was much less than among the foreign resident population.  At the same time, 
the rate of increase in German citizen representation in these institutions was more 
moderate than the rate of increase in foreign resident enrollment.  While the German 
citizen population maintained both its absolute and relative predominance in the higher-
status vocational schools, the foreign resident population did make relative gains in 
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several other vocational institutions.  Although the foreign resident population may not 
be making much headway in the more specialized vocational fields, there does appear to 
be a trend of greater incorporation of this population in most other vocational trades.  
These figures, at the very least, suggest that the foreign resident population is slowly 
gaining the resources necessary to strengthen their relative economic position.  This, in 
turn, means both that a larger segment of the foreign resident population will qualify for 
naturalization and that the economic disparity between native and foreign populations 
will be moderately reduced.   The lack of correlation between these numbers and 
naturalization figures, however, suggests that this is occurring independent of any process 
of integration.  The Nationality Act has largely failed to induce any process of economic 
integration and any convergence that has indeed occurred appears entirely unrelated to 
the increase in access to citizenship produced by the statute.   
Vocational Schools- Foreign Pupils by Types of Schools (4.3)20 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06   
Type of School Unit Absolute % Change 
     Total   
Part-Time Vocational Schools 1000 107.1 101.4 96.2 -5.1 
Pre-Vocational Training Year 1000 14 14 13.4 -3.9 
Basic Vocational Training Year 1000 5.3 5.2 5.5 6.8 
Vocational Extension Schools 1000 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.6 
Full-Time Vocational Schools (Berufsfachschluen) 1000 45.7 50 52.1 4.2 
Advanced Vocational Schools (Fachoberschulen) 1000 6.7 7 7.5 7.4 
Specialized Grammar Schools 1000 5.8 5.9 6.2 5.2 
"Berufsoberschulen/Technische Oberschulen" 1000 0.5 0.6 0.7 18.6 
Trade and Technical Schools 1000 7 6.6 6.1 -6.9 
Specialized Academics 1000 0.7 0.6 0.5 -13 
All School Types 1000 192.8 191.4 188.5 -1.5 
 
                                                
20 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/biwiku/schultab11.htm (accessed 
January 27, 2007). 
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Vocational Schools- Pupils by Types of Schools (4.4)21 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06   
Type of School Unit Absolute % Change 
     Total   
Part-Time Vocational Schools 1000 1685.3 16720 1656.3 -0.9 
Pre-Vocational Training Year 1000 79.3 80.6 77.7 -3.6 
Basic Vocational Training Year 1000 49.2 48.1 50.1 4.3 
Vocational Extension Schools 1000 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.9 
Full-Time Vocational Schools (Berufsfachschluen) 1000 498.3 541.8 560.7 3.5 
Advanced Vocational Schools (Fachoberschulen) 1000 117 121.7 126 3.5 
Specialized Grammar Schools 1000 114.5 117.5 121.2 3.2 
"Berufsoberschulen/Technische Oberschulen" 1000 13.7 17.5 19 8.4 
Trade and Technical Schools 1000 160.1 155.2 151.7 -2.3 
Specialized Academics 1000 7.4 7.5 7.4 -1.6 
All School Types 1000 2725.5 2762.6 2770.8 0.3 
  
As the data suggest, there is a significant difference between the relative 
economic positions of the majority and minority populations in Germany.  In terms of 
unemployment, a foreign resident is much more likely than an ethnic German counterpart 
to be unemployed.  As a result, foreign residents receive social assistance at a rate 
disproportionate with their actual population share.  These two straightforward indicators 
thus suggest that German citizens, on average, enjoy a much stronger economic position 
than foreign residents.  With the Nationality Act only coming into force at the beginning 
of 2000, however, it is plausible that these reforms simply have not had enough time to 
affect any economic convergence.  In this case, the foundations for such an economic 
convergence would be clearly visible in the foreign resident population’s increased 
utilization of educational and vocational opportunities.  The data, however, do not 
                                                
21 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/biwiku/schultab8.htm (accessed 
January 27, 2007). 
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support this supposition.  Rather, foreign resident enrollment in optional education 
opportunities, for instance, has actually declined in the post-2000 years, while, at the 
same time, German citizenship participation in these activities has increased.  Similarly, 
although foreign residents have enrolled in many vocational institutions at an increased 
rate during this timeframe, the moderate rate of increase prevents any prediction of 
widespread economic convergence between the majority and minority populations.  Since 
the Nationality Act does not in any way directly promote economic integration, economic 
integration instead must derive from the Nationality Act’s promotion of cultural and 
political integration.   The lack of extensive cultural and political integration suggested by 
the data thus necessitates a lack of economic integration.   
4.5- Concluding Remarks 
 Ultimately, structural integration derives from the interrelated promotion of 
cultural, political and economic incorporation.  In the context of the Nationality Act, 
political integration represents the primary impetus of structural integration.  The 
promotion of political integration, however, relies on both the willingness and eligibility 
of the foreign population.  Since the majority of the foreign resident population 
demonstrate an ability to satisfy the explicit requirements of the Nationality Act and 
most, if not all, of this population has the will to naturalize and integrate under the right 
circumstances, this chapter concludes that the incongruity between eligibility and 
application derives from the implicit cultural demands of the statute.  An examination of 
various cultural indicators reveals that a large segment of the foreign population still 
identifies strongly with non-German cultures, which, as a result, prevents this population 
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from satisfying the implicit cultural demands contained in the Nationality Act.  In the 
political realm, the foreign population did exhibit the interest in politics required for 
substantive political integration.  Despite this interest, however, the Nationality Act has, 
so far, failed to facilitate a deep process of political integration.  The liberalized 
naturalization standards produced by the immigration policy reforms have instead 
produced superficial political integration, which, in light of the inclination of this 
population towards passive involvement, appears entirely unsurprising.  Similarly, the 
economic data has revealed that not only has no economic integration occurred in the 
post-2000 years, but that no such process is likely in the near-future.  The failure of the 
increased access to citizenship produced by the Nationality Act to facilitate integration in 
these fields stems from the ethnocultural philosophy that informs the statute.  Despite the 
liberalizations produced by the Nationality Act, it is still fundamentally girded by 
ethnocultural ideology.  The power of the statute to induce structural integration is thus 
inevitably circumscribed by the foreign population’s attachment to non-German cultural 
heritages.  Not until the immigration and integration debate in Germany address the 
outmoded ideology of assimilationism will such naturalization liberalizations prove an 
effective tool of structural integration.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1- The Aftermath of Rütli 
As noted in the introduction to this study, the uncontrollable violence that plagued 
the Rütli School during the spring of 2006 firmly placed a spotlight on the need for 
comprehensive integration measures in Germany.  Mirroring widespread anti-foreigner 
sentiments, initial responses to the incident ranged from proposals for increased security 
in schools with large concentrations of foreign students to demands for harsh penalties 
for immigrants who failed to learn German.  This heated rhetoric, however, soon gave 
way to reasoned policy proposals.  These proposals, informed by the alarming similarity 
between the Rütli School violence and the riots in France during November of 2005, 
established the successful inclusion of this population into the German polity as the 
primary objective of foreigner policies.  From mandatory pre-school to wider offerings of 
German language instruction, these proposals thus focused on the underlying need to 
integrate the immigrant population into mainstream German society.  For the first time, 
integration, as opposed to assimilation, deportation or simple exclusion, represented the 
consensus approach to the management of the foreign resident population.1   
 With the Nationality Act of 1999 explicitly constructed as a means of addressing 
the systematic marginalization of the foreign resident community in Germany, events 
such as Rütli provide emphatic reminders of the failures of these reforms.  By liberalizing 
naturalization standards with the addition of a partial jus soli element, policymakers 
intended to increase access to citizenship and, in turn, officially integrate the foreign 
                                                
1 Rose-Anne Claremont, “Integration in Theory, Alienation in Practice,” Der Spiegel Online, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,433006,00.html (accessed March 30 2007). 
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population into the German nation-state.  Both theoretically and practically, however, this 
plan was fundamentally flawed.  As a result, the Nationality Act failed to produce both 
the widespread naturalization and the general integration that its drafters had envisioned.  
Instead, by temporarily satisfying public sentiments for reform, the statute effectively 
maintained the status quo.  These disappointing results, however, do not stem from the 
subtle machinations of racist German politicians; rather, the shortcomings of the 
Nationality Act ultimately derive from its construction in a post-Marshallian framework 
and its development from an ethnocultural policy tradition.   
5.2- Citizenship as Social Closure 
 An accurate comprehension of any policy requires a thorough understanding of its 
historical development.  In Germany, for instance, immigration policy has consistently 
developed from the country’s insistence on its non-immigration status.  Any significant 
migration to Germany was thus perceived as unique and temporary phenomenon.  As far 
back the seventeenth century, the various German states instituted these perceptions by 
systematically excluding immigrants from the state system. Unlike most modern 
immigration countries, the unique development of the German nation-state proved 
conducive to the maintenance of this outmoded construction of nationhood.  Specifically, 
the emergence of a German nation prior to a German state necessitated the development 
of stable markers of membership that did not rely on conventional territorial distinctions.  
As a result, German citizenship was forced to rely on the only other enduring and 
prevalent source of substantive distinction, personal characteristics (first with a descent-
based system and later with an ethnic citizenship regime).  Stemming directly from this 
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construction of German citizenship, immigrants, by their very nature, were institutionally 
excluded from official state membership.   
 German citizenship, by basing acquisition on inherited personal characteristics, 
therefore acted as the primary vehicle for the exclusion of the immigrant population. As a 
result of the historical role of state-membership in Germany, current understandings of 
German citizenship rely on basic post-Marshallian assumptions.  Specifically, citizenship 
in Germany defines inclusivity based primarily on the exclusion of designated minorities.  
As a result, German citizenship has traditionally acted as both “an instrument and object 
of social closure.”2  The practical means of this exclusion, distinctive personal 
characteristics, in turn led to the development of an ethnocultural construction of state-
membership, as in this context ethnicity and culture provide the only inheritable and 
discernible distinctions between individuals.  The modern German discourse on 
immigration and citizenship therefore rests on an ideologically charged distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens in the country.  
The Nationality Act then can only be accurately examined within the historical 
context established by the ethnocultural construction of German nationhood and the 
attendant post-Marshallian understanding of citizenship in the country.    Within this 
context, German citizenship emerges not as a universally-desirable, civically-constructed 
marker of formal inclusion into the state polity, but instead it appears as an ethnically-
shaped and culturally-potent means of self-identification.  As a result, naturalization is 
not a straightforward transformation of the nature of an individual’s membership status, it 
                                                
2 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992 23. 
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is instead an implicit conversion to a definitively German way of life.  While the 
Nationality Act unquestionably eases naturalization standards, it ultimately fails to 
address the heritage of ethnoculturalism that has continued to color the true nature of 
German citizenship.   
This shortcoming has effectively circumscribed the effectuality of the Nationality 
Act.  As Koopmans and Statham have noted, the “inclusiveness/exclusiveness of a 
national politics for incorporating ethnic difference can be defined along two dimensions 
of citizenship: first, the criteria for formal access to citizenship and second, the cultural 
obligations that this access to citizenship entails.”3  The Nationality Act effectively 
addresses the first dimension of citizenship by relaxing many formerly restrictive 
naturalization requirements.  The statute’s failure to address heritage of ethnoculturalism 
still present in contemporary conceptions of German citizenship, however, effectively 
maintains the prohibitively high cultural obligations that have traditionally characterized 
official state-membership in German.  The absence of any reconfiguration of German 
citizenship in the Nationality Act therefore results in the maintenance of volatile ethnic 
differences in the country.   
  The quantitative data clearly reflect this dynamic.  As a result of the liberalizing 
of formal citizenship requirements, naturalization rates do indeed spike after the 
implementation of the Nationality Act on January 1, 2000.  Despite the promise of this 
initial surge in naturalizations, these rates soon fall off to pre-reform levels.  Indeed, by 
2004, nearly 80 per cent of the seemingly eligible foreign resident population expressed 
                                                
3 Koopmans and Statham 46 (italics added) 
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no intention to apply for naturalization.  For this overwhelming majority, the data 
suggests, the implicit cultural demands of the Nationality Act represent prohibitive 
obstacles to naturalization.  The cultural data verify this supposition by revealing the 
tendency of this population to associate with native cultural identities prior to any 
adopted German identity.  As the result of this dynamic, the Nationality Act has 
ultimately failed to induce any sustained process of naturalization.   
Consequentially, the Nationality Act has fundamentally failed to facilitate the 
process of structural integration envisioned by its architects.  The cultural orientation of 
the foreign resident population, in the context of the ethnocultural nature of German 
citizenship, represents the primary deterrent of naturalization.  More practical elements, 
however, also inhibit this process.  Specifically (and most importantly), German language 
ability exerts a determining influence on the integration process.  German language 
proficiency not only increases social interactions with the native German population but 
it also provides the foreign resident community with an essential instrument of 
socioeconomic advancement.4   As a result, language fluency effectively facilitates the 
integration the foreign resident population in nearly every subsystem of German society.  
While the ethnocultural construction of German citizenship represents the primary 
deterrent of integration, the Nationality Act’s lack of any substantive integration 
measures also contributed to the maintenance of divisive ethnic differences in Germany.  
Future immigration and integration reforms must therefore strive for both a civic 
                                                
4 Program for International Student Assessment 2000: Overview of the Study: Design, Methods and 
Results, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 12.   
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construction of German citizenship and the implementation of pragmatic integration 
policies if they hope to facilitate a substantive process of integration in the country.   
5.3- A New Direction in German Immigration Policy 
 For the Federal Republic, the initial step in addressing the failure of the 
Nationality Act is to first recognize it.  In 2006, nearly six full years after the enactment 
of the Nationality Act, the Federal Statistical Office of Germany announced that during 
the previous year only 117,240 foreign residents naturalized, representing a decrease of 
nearly eight per cent from 2004.5  As the lowest such figure since 1998, policymakers 
soon began to discuss potential obstacles to naturalization.  In this context, Angela 
Merkel called for an integration summit to be held in Berlin during July of 2006.  With 
German language competency and basic civic knowledge serving as the foundations for 
integration, the summit developed a fresh approach to integrating the foreign resident 
population. The national integration plan that emerged from the summit thus focused o 
the implementation of integration courses, the promotion of language competency, and 
the encouragement of integration at school and in the workplace. 6  While this new 
approach has drawn some criticism from Muslim groups feeling marginalized from the 
decision-making process, the majority of the feedback has been quite positive.7  These 
practical steps, unlike passive naturalization reforms, represent an essential step in 
integrating the foreign resident population.   
                                                
5 Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Naturalizations Continue to Decrease in 2005,” July 20, 2006, 
http://www.destatis.de/presse/englisch/pm2006/p2950025.htm (accessed September 20, 2006). 
6 Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Immigration for the Future: Political Aims,” 
http://www.zuwanderung.de/ english/3 polit-ziele.html (accessed April 4, 2007). 
7 Financial Times Information Limited, “German Muslims Feel Marginalized in Run-Up to Berlin 
Integration Summit,” July 10, 2006 and British Broadcasting Corporation, “German Muslim Spokesperson 
Satisfied with Integration Summit,” July 17, 2006.     
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5.4- The Future of Integration Policy 
 The integration of the foreign resident population in Germany is necessary for the 
preservation of societal stability within the country.  Decades of exclusion have produced 
a population that is unquestionably marginalized and disempowered.  As a result, 
incidents such as the Rütli School violence have dominated media channels and colored 
popular conceptions of foreigners in Germany.  The Nationality Act largely acts as a 
response to such to such alarming episodes by attempting to more fully integrate the 
foreign resident population into mainstream German society.  As the empirical data in 
this study suggest, however, this statute has proved largely ineffective in this capacity.  
Indeed, the Nationality Act has actually maintained the gap between the cultural, political 
and economic positions of native and foreigners in Germany.  Although recent statutes, 
specifically the Nationality Act, have attempted to modernize citizenship policy by 
introducing a jus soli element, these reformed citizenship policies have been unable to 
completely escape the influence of Germany’s ethnocultural perception of nationhood.   
Recently, however, downward-trending naturalization figures have forced 
policymakers to reexamine the effectuality of these reforms.  In this context, German 
integration policy has begun to shift its focus towards more practical integration 
measures.  The new national integration plan, for instance, emphasizes the development 
of German language proficiency and the institution of integration courses as the 
foundation for a successful process of structural integration.  Unquestionably, such 
measures are essential to the successful integration of the foreign resident population.  
Despite the importance of such practical policies, however, Germany’s ethnocultural 
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legacy necessitates that these efforts be complimented by a fundamental transformation 
in the way the country perceives its foreign population.  This transformation, combined 
with practical integration measures, will provide the necessary foundations for the 
creation of both a unified and pluralistic German society.    
 117 
 
Bibliography 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation, “German Muslim Spokesperson Satisfied with 
Integration Summit,” July 17, 2006.     
 
Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung, http://www.emz-
berlin.de/Statistik_2/de /de_03.htm, (accessed January 27, 2007). 
 
Bird, Edward J., Hilke Kayser, Joachim R. Frick, and Gert G. Wagner, “The Immigrant 
Welfare Effect: Take-Up or Eligibility,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 
Discussion Paper No. 66, 1999. 
 
Body-Gendrot and Marco Martinello, ed. Minorities in European Cities, London: 
MacMillian Press, 2000.   
 
Böhning, W.R., “Estimating the Propensity of Guestworkers to Leave,” Monthly Labor 
Review, May (1981).   
 
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Key Lehman Schlozman, “Beyond SES: A Resource 
Model of Political Participation,” American Political Science Review 89, no.2 
(1995): 271-294. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992.   
 
Chapin, Wesley D., Germany for the Germans? The Political Effects of International 
Migration, London: Greenwood Press, 1997. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T., “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” 
International Studies Quarterly 43, no.1 (1999): 83-114. 
 
Claremont, Rose-Anne, “Integration in Theory, Alienation in Practice,” Der Spiegel 
Online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,433006,00.html (accessed 
March 30 2007). 
 
Constant, Amelie and Douglas S. Massey, “Labor Market Segmentation and the Earnings 
of German Guestworkers,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion 
Paper No. 774, 2003. 
 
Constant, Amelie and Douglas S. Massey, “Return Migration by German Guestworkers: 
Neoclassical versus New Economic Theories,” International Migration 40, no. 4 
(2002): 5-38. 
 
 118 
Constant, Amelie and Douglas S. Massey, “Self-Selection, Earnings, and Out-Migration: 
A Longitudinal Study of Immigrants to Germany,” Journal of Population 
Economics 16 (2003). 
 
Cyrus, Norbert, “Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany,” Country Report 
Prepared for the European Research Project POLITIS, Oldenburg, 2005. 
 
Dörr, Silvia, and Thomas Faist, “Institutional Conditions for the Integration of 
Immigrants in Welfare States: A Comparison of the Literature on Germany, 
France, Great Britain and the Netherlands,” European Journal of Political 
Research 31 (1997). 
 
Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany, “Immigration in the Past: Statistics,” 
http://www.zuwanderung.de/ english/1_statistik.html (accessed July 25, 2006). 
 
Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany, “Immigration for the Future: Political 
Aims,” http://www.zuwanderung.de/ english/3 polit-ziele.html (accessed April 4, 
2007). 
 
Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany, “The Modern Nationality Law,” 
http://www.bmi. bund.de (accessed December 20, 2006).   
 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “The Impact of Immigration on Germany’s 
Society,” Migration and Integration Research Department, October 2005. 
 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Foreign and Natives by Pupils by Type of 
Schools” http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/biwiku/schultab11.htm, (accessed 
January 27, 2007). 
 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Fewer Naturalizations in 2003,” 
http://www.destatis.de/ presse/englisch/pm2004/p2340025.htm (accessed 
November 6, 2006). 
 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany, “Foreign Population 1980 to 2005,” 
http://www.destatis. de/basis/e/bevoe/bevoetab7.htm, (accessed February 19, 
2007).   
 
Fertig, Michael and Christoph M. Schmidt, “First- and Second-Generation Immigrants in 
Germany- What Do We Know and What Do People Think,” Institute for the 
Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper, March 2001. 
 
Financial Times Information Limited, “German Muslims Feel Marginalized in Run-Up to 
Berlin Integration Summit,” July 10, 2006.   
 
 119 
Flusser, Vilem, The Freedom of the Migrant: Objections to Nationalism, Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003. 
 
German Social Science Infrastructure Services, “The International Social Survey 
Program,” http://www.gesis.org/en/index.htm, (accessed November 2, 2006). 
 
German Institute for Economic Research, “The German Socio-Economic Panel Study,” 
http://www.diw.de/english/sop/, (accessed October 9, 2006). 
 
Gordon, Milton M., Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and 
National Origins, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 
 
Halfmann, Jost, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany: Contemporary Dilemmas,” 
Political Studies XLV 1997.   
 
Held, David, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and 
Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.  
 
Hennesy, Eileen N., “The Heidelberg Manifesto: A German Reaction to Immigration,” 
Population and Development Review 8, no. 3, (1982): 636-637. 
 
Hülsse, Rainer, “Looking Beneath the Surface- Invisible Othering in the German 
Discourse about Turkey’s Possible EU-Ascension,” paper presented at the Ionian 
Conference, Corfu, Greece, May 19th-22nd, 2000.   
 
Independent Commission on Migration to Germany, “Structuring Immigration, Fostering 
Integration,” July 4, 2001. 
 
International Crisis Group, “Europe Report No 181: Islam and Identity in Germany,” 
March 14, 2007. 
 
Joppke, Christian, “How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 4 (1997). 
 
Joppke, Christian, Immigration and the Nation State: the United States, Germany, and 
Great Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Klopp, Brett, German Multiculturalism: immigrant Integration and the Transformation 
of Citizenship, London: Praeger Press, 2002. 
 
Koopmans, Ruud, “Germany and its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship,” Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25, no. 4 (1999). 
 
 120 
Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham, “Political Claims-Making against Racism and 
Discrimination in Britain and Germany,” in Comparative Perspectives on Racism, 
ed. Jessika ter Wal and Maykel Verkuyten (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 
139-170. 
 
Koppenfels, Amanda Klekowski, “Politically Minded: The Case of Aussiedler as an 
Ideologically Defined Category,” Sozialwissenschaftlicher Fachinformationsdienst, 
(2001). 
 
Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work 
on Citizenship Theory,” Ethics 104 (January 1994). 
 
Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Nordrhein-Westfalen, “Biografie Jürgen Rüttgers,” 
http://www.geschichte.nrw.de/artikel.php?artikel%5Bid%5D=622&lkz=de, (accessed 
February 23, 2007).   
 
Lindquist, John H., “Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation,” The Western 
Political Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1964): 608-614. 
 
Manz, Stefan, “Constructing a Normative National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in 
Germany, 2000/2001,” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 
25, no. 5/6 (2004): 481-496. 
 
Marshall, Barbara, Europe in Change: The New Germany and Migration in Europe, New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2000. 
 
Marshall, T.H. and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto Press, 
1950. 
 
May, David, “Theories of Integration Revisited: Towards an Interactive Model of 
Integration Strategies,” paper presented at the 6th ESA Conference, Research 
Stream on Immigration and Ageing Societies, Murcia, Spain, September 23-26, 
2003. 
 
Merz, Friedrich, “Friedrich Merz, Politiker, CDU,” Die Welt Online, March 21, 2001, 
http://www.welt.de/print-
welt/article440842/Friedrich_Merz_Politiker_CDU.html, (accessed February 23, 
2007). 
 
Morris, Lydia, “Rights and Controls in the Management of Migration: The Case of 
Germany,” The Sociological Review (2000): 224-240. 
 
 121 
Ögleman, Nedim, “Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics 
among Germany’s Turks,” International Migration Review 37, no. 1 (2003): 163-
193. 
 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Nationality Act (1913, as amended 
1999, http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?less=false&lid=1924&tid=1 
(accessed September 14, 2006). 
 
Özcan, Veysel, “Turks in Germany- Aspects of their Socio-Economic and Cultural 
Integration,” paper presented at the conference Integration of Immigrants from 
Turkey in Austria, Germany and Holland, Istanbul, Turkey, February 27-28 2004. 
 
Ozdemir, Cem, “Europe’s Awkward Embrace: European Conservatives Should Imitate 
U.S. Politicians and Learn to Love Immigrants,” Foreign Policy (January 2004): 
68-69. 
 
Phalet, Karen and Marc Swyngedouw, “Measuring Immigrant Integration: The Case of 
Belgium,” Migration Studies XL, no. 152 (2003): 772-803. 
 
Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany, Coalition 
Agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD, November, 2005. 
 
Program for International Student Assessment, “Where Immigrant Students Succeed- A 
Comparative Review of Performance and Engagement in PISA 2003,” OECD, 
2006. 
 
Riphahn, Regina T., “Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence 
from German Guestworkers,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), December 
21, 2004. 
 
Roggenkamp, Viola.  “…aber Sühelya möchte bleiben,” Die Zeit, 9: 72, February 28, 
1997. 
 
Schilly, Otto, “Foreword to the booklet Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht,” Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Government, August 1999. 
 
Schnable, Claus, “Trade Unions in Germany, 1980-2004: On the Road to Perdition?,” 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
 
Schneider, Jens, “Talking German: Othering Strategies in Public and Everyday 
Discourse,” Gazette 63, no. 4 (2001): 351-363. 
 
 122 
Scott, William and Alan C. Acock, “Socioeconomic Status, Unemployment Experience 
and Political Participation: A Disentangling of Main and Interaction Effects,” 
Political Behavior 1, no. 4 (1979): 361-381. 
 
Söllner, Fritz, “A Note on the Political Economy of Immigration,” Public Choice 100 
(1999): 245-251. 
 
Soysal, Yasemin, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in 
Europe, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
Thomas, Mark, “Migrant Labor, Citizenship and Social Provision in Contemporary 
Welfare States,” paper presented at the International Sociological Association 
Annual Conference, Chicago, September 2005. 
 
Tucci, Ingrid, “What are the Effects of Naturalization on the Socio-Economic Integration 
of Immigrants?  The Case of France and Germany,” German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW), 2004. 
 
Wagner, Gert G., Felix Büchel, John P. Haisken-DeNew and C. Katharina Spiess, 
‘Education as a Keystone of Integration of Immigrants: Determinants of School 
Attainment of Immigration Children in West Germany,” Immigration, 
Citizenship, and the Welfare state in Germany and the United States, London: JAI 
Press, 1998. 
 
Young, Marc “Germany’s School of Hard Knocks,” Der Spiegel, April 05, 2006, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,409876,00.html, (accessed November 
3, 2006). 
 
Yüce, Yasemin, “The Challenge of Becoming an Immigration Country: The Case of 
Germany in the Light of the New Legal Draft on Immigration,” a thesis submitted 
to the Graduate School of Social Sciences at the Middle East Technical 
University, November 2003. 
 
Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, “Internationale Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Umfrage 2004: Bürger und Staat,” 
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object= http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy 
/ZA3950, (accessed February 28, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
